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Article
CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION PETITIONERS' RIGHT TO
COUNSEL: INTEGRATING ACCESS TO COURT




Two separately developed lines of Supreme Court decisions,
generally characterized by courts as "access to court" and "proce-
dural due process" decisions,' have produced constitutional rights
to legal help in certain civil cases. Despite flickers of mutual recog-
nition,' these decisions remain virtual jurisprudential strangers,
* Associate Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. B.A., Dartmouth
College, 1966; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1969.
There were a number of people whose creativity and hard work are reflected in this
article. They include, Evan Caminker, Joseph Ttrauh, Karen Schifter, and Michael
Mello. They have been indispensable in developing the major themes of this article and,
often, in best expressing these themes. I deeply appreciate their very important contri-
butions. I also am very thankful for the good editorial suggestions of Richard Burr,
George Kendall, and Ronald Tabak, as well as the help for this article that was provided
by Stephen H. Sachs and the law firm of Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering. They most
generously supported much of the work that I did on this article in the best pro bono
tradition. This article also could not have been written and published without the very
special hard work of Karen Gallion, Shirley Appelt, and many members of the Maryland
Law Review editorial staff, to whom I am very much indebted.
i. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (access to court case);Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (same); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18
(1981) (procedural due process decision); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
(same). For lower court "access to court" decisions implementing Bounds, see infta note
50.
2. Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971), grounded the access to court right (access right) in the promise of due process,
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even though the rights they separately recognize have a common
history,3 function,4 and constitutional source. 5
The procedural due process doctrine is presently the more de-
veloped of the two embryonic rights to legal help. The access to
court doctrine, essentially having been estranged from its natural
twin, has yet to fully mature. If properly reintroduced to and
merged with procedural due process analysis, the now fragmented
access to court right (access right) can blossom into a more coher-
ent, integrated, and constitutionally justifiable right to legal help in
specific civil cases.
The Supreme Court's recent grant of certiorari in Murray v.
Giarratano6 presents the Court with an important opportunity to
clarify both the scope of the access right and the analysis that best
supports it. The district court in Giarratano v. Murray7 found that a
holding unconstitutional the State's failure to waive court fees and costs for indigent
litigants seeking divorces. Id. at 380-81. He performed a version of the procedural due
process balancing test, see infra text accompanying notes 79-82, to justify his decision.
He noted, however, that "this Court has seldom been asked to view access to the courts
as an element of due process." Id. at 375. But see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579
(1974) ("The right of access to the courts.., is founded in the Due Process Clause and
assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allega-
tions concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights."). See also Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrru-rioNAL LAw § 10-18,
at 753-60 (2d ed. 1988). See generally Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access
Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153 [hereinafter
Michelman-Part 1]; Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One's Rights-Part 11, 1974 DUKE L.J. 527; Note, A Prisoner's Constitutional Right to
Attorney Assistance, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1279 (1983).
3. See infra note 230.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 83-84.
5. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 10-18, at 759 ("[lit would be surprising, and ulti-
mately indefensible, if the separate strands of doctrine .. .- including procedural due
process, equal protection, and the first amendment rights of speech and petition-were
not in the end woven into a fundamental right of access to a neutral and fair tribunal in
which to ventilate such claims of right as one may have under the governing body of
substantive law."). See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963) (litigation
may be a protected form of political expression); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,
357-58 (1963) (equal protection clause requires states to provide appellate counsel to
indigents in criminal cases); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion)
(equal protection and due process allow no "invidious discriminations" in criminal trials
and appellate review). See generally Mello, Is There a Federal Constitutional Right to Counsel in
Capital Post-Conviction Proceedings?, 79J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 801 (1988); Note, supra
note 2. These additional constitutional sources form the due process analysis. In the
context of capital post-conviction proceedings, the access right is also supported by the
sixth and eighth amendments as well as by the equal protection clause. See infra text
accompanying notes 263-305.
6. 109 S. Ct. 303 (1988).
7. 668 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 836 F.2d 1421 (4th
Cir.), on reh'g, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 303 (1988).
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prison law library does not provide death-sentenced prisoners with
meaningful access to the courts" to investigate, prepare, and litigate
capital post-conviction claims in state courts. 9 The district court
also found that Virginia does not provide sufficient attorney assist-
ance to death-sentenced prisoners in post-conviction cases to imple-
ment their access right.'" The court required the State to provide
counsel to death-sentenced prisoners to prepare and draft post-con-
viction pleadings and to litigate the post-conviction cases."
8. 668 F. Supp. at 513 ("[Pjlaintiffs are incapable of effectively using lawbooks to
raise their claims. Consequently, the provision of a library does little to satisfy Virginia's
obligation to 'assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers'
with respect to Virginia death row prisoners." (quoting Bounis v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,
828 (1977))).
9. 668 F. Supp. at 514. At present, 49 of 50 states provide by statute or rule that,
after a criminal conviction is finally affirmed on direct appeal, the convicted defendant
may file in state court a "collateral" proceeding challenging the legality of the convic-
tion. This proceeding is commonly called a "post-conviction" proceeding, but also is
called "habeas corpus" or "coram nobis." See D. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL AND STATE POST-
CONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF 283 app. A ("A Survey of Current Postconviction
Remedies and Relief In Each of the Fifty States and the District of Columbia") (2d ed.
1987). The constitutional right to counsel to investigate, prepare, and litigate state capi-
tal post-conviction proceedings, by whatever names they are called, is the focus of this
article.
10. 668 F. Supp. at 514-15. The district court first considered (a) "the limited
amount of time death row inmates may have to prepare and present their petitions to
the courts," (b) "the complexity and difficulty of the legal work itself," and (c) the "fair
inference that an inmate preparing himself and his family for impending death is incapa-
ble of performing the mental functions necessary to adequately pursue his claims." Id.
at 513. The court then found that the institutional attorneys provided by Virginia serve
as advisors but do not make factual investigations, sign pleadings, or appear in court;
they function as "talking lawbooks." Id. at 514. "For death row inmates, more than the
sporadic assistance of a 'talking lawbook' is required to enable them to file meaningful
legal papers." Id. While Virginia courts are authorized to appoint counsel, see VA. CODE
ANN. § 14.1-183 (1950 & Supp. 1988), such counsel are appointed after a petition is filed
and only if the court finds it to be meritorious. 668 F. Supp. at 514-15. Noting that the
pool of volunteer attorneys has been seriously depleted, the district court concluded
that
[t]he matter of a death row inmate's habeas corpus petition is too important-
both to society, which has a compelling interest in insuring that a sentence of
death has been constitutionally imposed, as well as to the individual involved-
to leave to, what is at best, a patchwork system of assistance. These plaintiffs
must have the continuous assistance of counsel in developing their claims.
Id. at 515.
11. Girrantano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511,517 (E.D. Va. 1986). Relying on Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), the district court declined to require the State to appoint
counsel to seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. 668 F. Supp. at 516.
Also, the district court, reasoning that prisoners could effectively use the arguments and
papers already prepared by counsel during the earlier state proceedings and relying on
the availability of appointed counsel in federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982),
refused to extend the relief granted to federal habeas corpus proceedings. 668 F. Supp.
at 517.
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A divided circuit court panel reversed.' 2 Sitting en banc, how-
ever, the entire court affirmed the district court's decision.'"
This article uses Giarratano as a vehicle for exploring and justify-
ing the marriage of the access to court and due process analyses.
Applying this combined analysis to the issue presently before the
Court in Giarratano, this article concludes that death-sentenced pris-
oners are constitutionally entitled to the assistance of appointed
counsel to investigate, prepare, and litigate capital post-conviction
proceedings.'
4
In overview, Parts I and II of this article trace the separate de-
velopment of the access to court and procedural due process rights.
Part III re-examines the access right and concludes that the
Supreme Court implicitly-but should have explicitly-justified it
with a procedural due process analysis. Part IV applies this consoli-
dated doctrinal analysis in the capital post-conviction context, iden-
tifying the death-sentenced prisoner's private interest in the
appointment of counsel, the competing and complementary state in-
terests, and the risk of error that results from pro se representation in
capital post-conviction proceedings. Part V concludes that the bal-
ance of these factors requires automatic appointment of counsel to
capital post-conviction petitioners. Part V then bolsters this conclu-
sion by identifying how capital post-conviction petitioners' interests
12. 836 F.2d 1421 (4th Cir. 1988). The panel opinion relied upon Pennsylvania v.
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987), decided after the district court rendered its decision,
for the proposition that "there is no previously established constitutional right to coun-
sel in state habeas corpus proceedings." 836 F.2d at 1424. Rejecting the district court's
findings of fact as clearly erroneous, id. at 1423, the panel stated that "[tihe record addi-
tionally fails to establish that there is a unique legal complexity to death penalty cases."
Id. at 1426. The panel opinion castigated the district court. "In essence, by reading the
record to support a sweeping extension of Bounds, the district court has, under the guise
of meaningful access, established a right of counsel where none is required by the Con-
stitution." Id. at 1423.
13. 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988). The en banc opinion distinguished Finley, 481
U.S. 551, as follows:
Finley was not a meaningful access case, nor did it address the rule enunciated
in Bounds v. Smith. Most significantly, Finley did not involve the death pen-
alty.... We do not, therefore, read Finley as suggesting that the counsel cannot
be required under the unique circumstances of postconviction proceedings in-
volving a challenge to the death penalty.
847 F.2d at 1122.
14. When this article generally refers to "the constitutional right to counsel" in capi-
tal post-conviction proceedings, it should be understood more specifically to mean the
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel to investigate, prepare, and litigate state
post-conviction proceedings (including all prehearing motions) to their conclusion.
This article does not consider whether there is a comparable right to the assistance of
counsel in the appeal of capital post-conviction cases or in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings. For the latter aspect, see infra notes 235-236.
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in other constitutional rights-including interests derived from the
sixth amendment, the eighth amendment, and the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment-should be included and
weighed in the due process formula. Part VI analyzes and. distin-
guishes Pennsylvania v. Finley, 5 in which the Supreme Court held
that the procedural requirements governing withdrawal of counsel
prescribed by Anders v. California 6 were inapplicable in noncapital
post-conviction proceedings and, in so doing, questioned whether
there is a right to counsel in such proceedings. 7
I. THE ACCESS TO COURT CASES
In Boddie v. Connecticut ' 8 Justice Harlan began his analysis of the
access right by describing the fundamental importance of the rule of
law:
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive
society is more fundamental than its erection and enforce-
ment of a system of rules defining the various rights and
duties of its members, enabling them to govern their affairs
and definitively settle their differences in an orderly, pre-
dictable manner. Without such a "legal system," social or-
ganization and cohesion are virtually impossible .... Put
more succinctly, it is this injection of the rule of law that
allows society to reap the benefits of rejecting what polit-
ical theorists call the "state of nature."' 9
The assumptions underlying the rule of law are, first, that the law
will be enforced and, second, that litigants will have access to the
enforcement fora, primarily courts. The access cases, which incor-
porate these two assumptions, address the special measures that are
necessary to assure that some members of society can obtain the
hearing in court that is the predicate of the rule of law.
This said, much remains unsaid. When the Supreme Court has
spoken, it has been about the access right of either special litigants
or litigants who have special claims.20 The special litigants to whom
the Court has paid greatest attention are state prisoners.
The primary access principle embodied in the Court's prisoner
15. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
16. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
17. 481 U.S. at 555.
18. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
19. Id. at 374.
20. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (state prisoners); Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (divorce proceedings).
1989)
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decisions has evolved in three phases. The Court first prohibited
state action that directly obstructed access, then state action that in-
directly interfered with access, and finally, state inaction: the state's
failure to provide affirmative help to prisoners.
In phase one, the Court invalidated restrictions that literally de-
nied prisoners the ability to lodge legal papers in a court of law. In
Ex pare Hull2 the Court held unconstitutional a prison regulation
that authorized a legal investigator for the parole board to intercept
prisoner habeas corpus petitions that were thought not to be prop-
erly drawn.' 2
In phase two, the Court held that the access right guarantees
more than the literal right to file documents in court. InoJohnson v.
Avery 23 the Court held that unless the state or some other source
provides legal help to indigent prisoners, the state may not indirectlv
obstruct access by preventing prisoner "writ writers" from "prepar-
ing writs," including writs of habeas corpus, for other indigent
prisoners. 4
Younger v. Gilmore 5 marked the beginning of phase three. In
Younger the Court cryptically indicated2 6 that the access right is not
satisfied by state inaction or alleged neutrality, i.e., when the state
refrains from interfering-either directly or indirectly-with pris-
oner access to the courts. Instead, the access right requires, in some
circumstances, that states provide affirmative help to indigent
prisoners 27
21. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
22. Id. at 549 ("[T]he state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's
right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. Whether a petition for writ
of habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is properly drawn and what allegations it
must contain are questions for that court alone to determine." (citations omitted)).
23. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
24. Id. at 490 ("[U]nless and until the State provides some reasonable alternative to
assist inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief, it may not validly
enforce a regulation such as that here in issue, barring inmates from furnishing such
assistance to other prisoners." (footnote omitted)). Justice Fortas, writing for the
Court, emphasized the "fundamental importance of the writ of habeas corpus in our
constitutional scheme." Id. at 485 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)). "Since the
basic purpose of the writ is to enable those unlawfully incarcerated to obtain their free-
dom, it is fundamental that access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of present-
ing their complaints may not be denied or obstructed." Id. Justice Fortas found that "in
the absence of any other source of assistance," preventing "writ writers" from helping
"illiterate or poorly educated prisoners... file habeas corpus petitions" is the functional
equivalent of forbidding them to file such petitions. Id. at 487.
25. 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam).
26. It affirmed, per curiam, the judgment of the three-judge district court in Gilmore
v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 404 U.S. at 15.
27. The district court in Gilmore said:
460 [VOL. 48:455
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In Bounds v. Smith " the Court consolidated its prior access deci-
sions by providing a specific description of the affirmative assistance
that a state must provide all prisoners to implement the access right.
Initially, the Court made the implicit Younger access holding explicit
by expressly rejecting the argument that "this constitutional duty
merely obliges states to allow inmate 'writ writers' to function" and
imposes "no further obligation to expend state funds to implement
affirmatively the right of access." 29 The Court held instead that the
access right places an affirmative obligation on states to develop
positive, "remedial measures to insure that inmate access to the
courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful."" ° The Court empha-
sized that "meaningful access" is the "touchstone" of the right.3"
The Court then defined the nature of the affirmative remedial
assistance due prisoners: "IlThe fundamental constitutional right
of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates
in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by provid-
ing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance
from persons trained in the law."32 Although the Court held that,
under the facts of Bounds, states may choose to provide either law
books or legal services to prisoners, 3 Justice Marshall, writing for
"Access to the courts" encompasses all the means a defendant or petitioner
might require to get a fair hearing from the judiciary on all charges brought
against him or grievances alleged by him .... Johnson v. Avery makes it clear
that some provision must be made to ensure that prisoners have the assistance
necessary to file petitions and complaints which will in fact be fully considered
by the courts.
319 F. Supp. at 110.
The district court held that, in order to implement the prisoner access right, Cali-
fornia was required to provide inmates with adequate law libraries or assistance from
legally trained persons. Id. at 110-11. In this respect, the court noted that "[t]he alter-
natives open to the State are legion. It might authorize Public Defenders to help in-
mates in collateral proceedings. Or it could institute programs whereby law students
and professors could aid the indigent convict," Id.
28. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
29. Id. at 823.
30. Id. at 822.
31. Id. at 823 (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)).
32. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (footnote omitted).
33. Id. at 830-31. See Note, supra note 2, at 1286 n.49 (author observed that, in
Bounds, "there was no appeal of the lower court's decision that no attorneys were
needed, and thus the issue [of whether effective access requires state-provided counsel]
was not before the Court"). After the Supreme Court's decision in Bounds, the litigation
continued as the prisoners renewed their claim that the law libraries were inadequate.
See Smith v. Bounds, 610 F. Supp. 597 (E.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd, 813 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir.
1987), aff'don reh'g, 841 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 179 (1988) (recit-
ing procedural history of the case). As stated in Harrington v. Holshouser, 741 F.2d 66
(4th Cir. 1984), aff'don rehkg, 841 F.2d 77 (4th Cir.), cei. denied, 109 S. Ct. 179 (1988), an
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the majority, observed that legal services programs are the wiser
means of implementing the access right, even for prison inmates
who are thought to be entirely capable of self-help.3 4
appeal from the district court's dismissal of the action after the second remand, "seven
years after the Supreme Court decision in Bounds v. Smith, the same legal action re-
mains still unresolved on this appeal despite Harrington's efforts, through a series of
petitions and motions, to ensure compliance with the Supreme Court's mandate.'.' Id. at
67.
After further remand, the district court held that in view of the inadequacies of
North Carolina's prison law library system, the State would be required to provide pris-
oners with, "in some form, the assistance of counsel." Smith v. Bounds, 610 F. Supp. at
606. But see Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 1433, 1435 (11 th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 781
F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 913 (1986) ("Although it may take more
decisions to ascertain exactly what the Supreme Court will decide is constitutionally re-
quired to assure 'meaningful access,' we know from the Bounds holding that the Supreme
Court does not presently interpret those words to require the mandatory provision of
legal services."). Judge Clark, joined by Judge Hatchett, dissented from the Eleventh
Circuit's denial of the petition for rehearing in the Hooks case, stating that "[t]he
Supreme Court in Bounds was not asked to compel assistance of counsel and thus did not
decide the issue presented to the panel in this case." 781 F.2d at 1551 (Clark & Hatch-
ett, JJ., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
34. 430 U.S. at 830-31. Justice Marshall said:
Nearly half the States and the District of Columbia provide some degree of
professional or quasi-professional legal assistance to prisoners .... Such pro-
grams take many imaginative forms and may have a number of advantages over
libraries alone. Among the alternatives are the training of inmates as paralegal
assistants to work under lawyers' supervision, the use of paraprofessionals and
law students, either as volunteers or in formal clinical programs, the organiza-
tion of volunteer attorneys through bar associations or other groups, the hiring
of lawyers on a part-time consultant basis, and the use of full-time staff attor-
neys, working either in new prison legal assistance organizations or as part of
public defender or legal services offices. Legal services plans not only result in
more efficient and skillful handling of prisoner cases, but also avoid the discipli-
nary problems associated with writ writers. Independent legal advisors can me-
diate or resolve administratively many prisoner complaints that would
otherwise burden the courts, and can convince inmates that other grievances
against the prison or the legal system are ill-founded, thereby facilitating reha-
bilitation by assuring the inmate that he has not been treated unfairly.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
It should be noted that in assessing the adequacy of any access remedy the burden
of justification is on the state. See Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1980)
("The burden of proof of demonstrating adequate alternate means is on the jail authori-
ties." (citation omitted)); Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223, 228 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979) ("It is well established ... that the state bears the burden of
demonstrating the adequacy of such an alternate means of access.") (citations omitted);
Corpus v. Estelle, 551 F.2d 68, 70 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he state or state agency ... has
the burden of proving the existence of reasonable alternatives.").
This "burden ofjustification" is a heavy one. It is not the theoretical, but the actual
availability of assistance to every prisoner that is required. In Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d
661 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972), the court required "the State to
carry the burden of justifying its regulation against inmate assistance by producing evi-
dence that establishes in specific terms what the need is for legal assistance on habeas
corpus matters in the [Texas Department of Correction], and by demonstrating that it is
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Although the Bounds Court suggested that the scope of the ac-
cess right is broader, s" it emphasized that "we are concerned in
large part with original actions seeking new trials, release from con-
finement, or vindication of fundamental civil rights."3s6 The Court
explained this special "concern": "[H]abeas corpus and civil rights
actions are of 'fundamental importance . ..in our constitutional
scheme' because they directly protect our most valued rights."37
The dissenting Justices in Bounds criticized the majority for con-
verting the access right from a shield (that prevents state interfer-
reasonably satisfying that need." Id. at 664 (emphasis in original). See also Glover v.
Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1979) ("The adequacy of a prisoner's
right of access to the courts must be measured by the actual opportunity he or she has to
raise a valid and meaningful claim before the courts." (citation omitted)).
35. The Court spoke of the "legal needs" of the prison population, 430 U.S. at 832,
thus acknowledging that prisoners have many of the same legal problems, such as di-
vorce and child custody disputes, as those at liberty. See Hadix v. Johnson, 694 F. Supp.
259, 295 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (prison legal assistance program to provide help in "domes-
tic relations, personaI injury, deportation, workers compensation, social security, de-
tainer, wills and estates, and taxation").
36. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. at 817, 827 (1977).
The literal language as well as the logic of Bounds demonstrates that such "original
actions" include state post-conviction proceedings, and also establishes the minimum
contours of the access right. In responding to the State's contention that the statutory
provision for the appointment of counsel to indigents, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451
(Supp. 1975), fully implemented the access right of prisoners in post-conviction cases,
the Court pointed out that counsel were appointed only if the petition withstood an
initial review by the court. 430 U.S. at 828 n.17. A belated appointment thus did not
provide any assistance to a prisoner seeking to prepare a post-conviction petition. The
Court added that "[m]oreover, this statute does not cover appointment of counsel in
federal habeas corpus or state or federal civil rights actions, all of which are encom-
passed by the right of access." Id.
This observation was critical, for the Court employed it to distinguish Ross v. Mof-
fitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). Moffitt held that the State was not required to provide counsel
for an indigent criminal defendant seeking discretionary review in either the State's
highest court or in the Supreme Court, as the petitioner seeking such review would be
able to make use of the trial transcripts and the briefs filed in the intermediate appellate
court as well as the opinion issued by that court. Id. at 615. The Court also relied on the
fact that discretionary review is not primarily concerned with the correctness of the judg-
ment below but rather with the direction of the law as a whole. Id. at 615-16. The
Bounds Court noted that, unlike the actions discussed in Moffitt, petitions for post-convic-
tion relief (as well as complaints of violations of civil rights) are indeed original actions.
"Rather than presenting claims that have been passed on by two courts, they frequently
raise heretofore unlitigated issues." 430 U.S. at 827.
While applications for discretionary review need only apprise an appellate
court of a case's possible relevance to the development of the law, the prisoner
petitions here are the first line of defense against constitutional violations. The
need for new legal research or advice to make a meaningful initial presentation
to a trial court in such a case is far greater than is required to file an adequate
petition for discretionary review.
Id. at 827-28 (footnote omitted).
37. 430 U.S. at 827 (quotingJohnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969)).
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ence) to a sword (that commands state assistance), i.e., for rejecting
the concept of state "neutrality."" 8 But this criticism is unfounded
because in virtually no access context is the state a neutral actor.39
Most clearly the state is not a neutral actor when it administers a
criminal justice system. The state acts affirmatively with the full
force of its constitutionally authorized powers when it convicts one
of a crime and incarcierates that person. In so doing, the state physi-
cally separates the convicted person from potential sources of legal
help and also creates the prisoner's standing to assert the underly-
ing habeas corpus claim that is at the core of the Bounds access right.
Moreover, during incarceration, the right to unconditional liberty is
replaced with a significantly more qualified institutional "bill of
rights."40 Alleged state denials of these qualified freedoms during
incarceration help produce the underlying civil rights claims that the
38. 430 U.S. at 834-35 (Burger. C.J., dissenting); id. at 837 (Stewart, J., dissenting);
id. at 839-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Then Justice, now Chief Justice, Rehnquist
said:
The prisoners here in question have all pursued all avenues of direct appeal
available to them from their judgments of conviction, and North Carolina im-
poses no invidious regulations which allow visits from all persons except those
knowledgeable in the law. All North Carolina has done in this case is to decline
to expend public funds to make available law libraries to those who are incar-
cerated within its penitentiaries.
Id. at 839 (dissenting opinion).
39. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). In Boddie, the Court held
that states were required to waive the costs and fees charged indigent litigants in divorce
cases because only an adjudication could produce the decree that is "the exclusive pre-
condition to the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship." Id. at 382-83. jus-
tice Brennan criticized the narrowness of the Court's holding. He said that "a State has
an ultimate monopoly of all judicial process and attendant enforcement machinery." Id.
at 387 (concurring in part). Cf. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1973) (bank-
ruptcy filing fees may be required). Justice Stewart would have allowed Kras to proceed
without paying the fees. "(l]n the unique situation of the indigent bankrupt, the Gov-
ernment provides the only effective means of his ever being free of these Government-
imposed obligations." Id. at 455 (dissenting opinion). See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 16-
11, at 1462 ("[T]he state's rules of contract, and its laws against forcible self-help, make
judicial decision the only lawful mechanism for securing a binding determination against
a recalcitrant opponent in any case." (emphasis in original)). See Michelman-Part 1,
supra note 2, at 1178-85.
40. "Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of
many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our
penal system." Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). See also Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (prisoners have no fourth amendment expectation of privacy
in cells); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823-24 (1974) (prisoner's first amendment
rights must be balanced against legitimate needs of correctional system). See generally A.
BRONSTEIN & P. HIRSCHKOP, PRISONERS' RIGHTS (1979); S. KRANTZ, THE LAW OF COR-
RECTIONS AND PRISONER RIGHTS (3d ed. 1986); R. SINGER & W. STATSKY, RIGHTS OF THE
IMPRISONED (1974).
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Bounds access right also expressly protects.4 Furthermore, the
state, one of the most powerful opposing litigants, defends both
habeas corpus and civil rights claims and, through litigation, seeks
to validate the denials of unconditional liberty and qualified free-
doms. Finally, the judiciary, another state agent, administers a dis-
pute resolution monopoly that determines whether the state's
denials of unconditional and qualified freedoms are legally justified
and therefore should continue.4" Under these circumstances, the
state is not a neutral actor and does not have a legitimate claim to
inaction when its wards seek the help that is minimally necessary to
vindicate claims that may restore unconditional liberty and more
qualified forms of personal freedom.
Former Chief Justice Burger summarized this consequential
principle of involuntary commitment that partially underlies the
Bounds access right:
When a sheriff or a marshall takes a man from a courthouse
in a prison van and transports him to confinement for two
or three or ten years, this is our act. We have tolled the
bell for him. And whether we like it or not, we have made
him our collective responsibility. We are free to do some-
thing about him; he is not.45
The fairer question about Bounds is not whether the state incurs
an affirmative obligation to ensure prisoner access, but what is the
scope of that obligation. The right to "meaningful" and "effective"
access Bounds recognizes may be fatally eroded by the disjunctive
remedy it assertedly provides: law books or legal help from those
trained in the law. In the context of the facts before the Court,
Bounds plainly can be read to require only law books for cognitively
normal prisoners who wish to assert noncapital habeas corpus and
civil rights claims. 44
In Bounds, however, the Court seemed to recognize that the ac-
41. In Bounds Justice Powell noted that "in Wolff v. McDonnell ... we extended the
right of access . . . to civil rights actions arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 ......
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 833 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
42. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 387 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part) ("As a practical matter, if disputes cannot be successfully settled between the par-
ties, the court system is usually 'the only forum effectively empowered to settle their
disputes. Resorts to the judicial process by these plaintiffs is no more voluntary in a
realistic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests in court.'
(quoting 401 U.S. at 376-77 (majority opinion))).
43. W. Burger, No Man is an Island 6 (1980) (speech to mid-year meeting of Ameri-
can Bar Ass'n) (on file at the Supreme Court, Washington, D.C.).
44. But see supra note 33.
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cess remedy should vary to accommodate the context in which the
right is asserted; it did not rigidify a right that had been evolving for
decades. Indeed, it specifically rejected the State's argument that it
had defined the full scope of the access right in its prior decisions.
The State argued that by allowing prisoner "writ writers" to help
indigent prisoners, it had done all it was constitutionally obligated
to do by the Court's prior access cases. But the Court responded
that it had not intended "to set forth the full breadth of the right of
access" 4 5 in its prior cases, particularlyJohnson v. Avery 4 6 and Wolff v.
McDonnell.47 In Johnson and Wolff the Court expressed unresolved
concern about prisoners who were not capable of legal self-help. In
Johnson the Court adopted the lower court's conclusion that " '[flor
all practical purposes, if such prisoners cannot have the assistance of
a "jail house lawyer," their possibly valid constitutional claims will
never be heard in any court.' "' In Wolff the Court reasoned simi-
larly that "the recognition" of the "constitutional rights" of prison-
ers "would be diluted if inmates," who "often [are] 'totally or
functionally illiterate,' " were not given assistance by others.49
Speaking of Johnson and Wolff later in Bounds, the Court said:
"Neither case considered the question we face today and neither is
inconsistent with requiring additional measures to assure meaning-
ful access to inmates able to present their own cases." 5 Those ex-
45. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824 (1977).
46. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
47. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
48. 393 U.S. at 487 (quotingJohnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783, 784 (M.D. Tenn.
1966)). Justice White, who dissented because he believed "writ writers" posed a secur-
ity risk, acknowledged: "[T]he illiterate or poorly educated and inexperienced indigent
cannot adequately help himself and ... unless he secures aid from some other source he
is effectively denied the opportunity to present to the courts what may be valid claims for
post-conviction relief." d. at 498 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White expressed un-
derstandable doubts that there is a "fellow inmate who is competent to help." Id. at
499.
49. 418 U.S. at 579. By "others" the Court meant an inmate adviser and other in-
mates. Id. at 579-80.
50. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824 (1977). Circuit courts have understood that
Bounds requires the state to provide "additional measures" to special categories of in-
mates who cannot effectively use libraries. The Third Circuit, like the Fourth, inter-
preted Bounds to mean that the state may be required to appoint counsel to death-
sentenced prisoners. The Third Circuit said:
[T]he Court in Bounds did not suggest that the right of access to the courts is
always to be measured by a single invariant standard irrespective of the nature
of the proceedings. It may well be that the scope of access to legal resources
required under Bounds varies according to the proceeding. In proceedings di-
rectly implicating the validity of a death-sentenced prisoner's conviction, the
availability of legal assistance from lawyers, rather than from other sources of
legal knowledge, is more central to the vindication of prisoners' claims than in
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press caveats, as well as the flexible analysis that the Court
employed in Bounds,"' contradict the notion that the Bounds Court
intended to immobilize the access remedy in a static and inflexible
form that ignores the context in which the right exists.
A critical question was left open by the Bounds Court: under
what circumstances, if any, is a state constitutionally required to
provide more than a law library to prisoners. The implicit analytic
framework in Bounds suggests the answer to this profoundly impor-
tant question.52 Because it is the same analytic framework that is
explicit in the procedural due process cases, those cases are consid-
ered first.
II. THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CASES
In the procedural due process cases, the Supreme Court has
spoken about the process due a litigant in a pending or imminent
other civil claims filed by a death-sentenced prisoner, such as, for example,
those complaining of conditions of confinement.
Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1047 (3d Cir. 1988) (remanding to district court to
determine if Bounds violation exists). See also Valentine v. Beyer, 850 F.2d 951, 956-57
(3d Cir. 1988) (proposed change in prison legal services plan did not take into account
needs of illiterate, non-English-speaking or "closed custody" prisoners); Harrington v.
Holshouser, 741 F.2d 66, 69 (4th Cir. 1984), aff'd on reh'g, 841 F.2d 77 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 179 (1988) (prison regulations sufficiently allow access to libraries by
prisoners on disciplinary segregation); Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 721 (5th Cir. 1980)
(on remand district court to consider whether legal assistants are necessary to provide
meaningful access for illiterate or non-English-speaking prisoners).
District courts also have concluded that the Bounds access remedy must be tailored
to meet the needs of special categories of prisoners even if a constitutionally adequate
prison law library exists. See Hadix v. Johnson, 694 F. Supp. 259, 294-95 (E.D. Mich.
1988) (legal assistance program including attorneys required to remedy, inter alia, defi-
ciencies in access provided to illiterate or segregated prisoners); United States ex re.
Para-Professional Law Clinic v. Kane, 656 F. Supp. 1099, 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1987). aff'd
mem., 835 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988) (closing inmate-run
legal clinic would violate rights of functionally illiterate prisoners); Knop v. Johnson,
655 F. Supp. 871, 881 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (deficiencies in providing access to law librar-
ies for segregated prisoners); Cody v. Hillard, 599 F. Supp. 1025, 1061 (D.S.D. 1984)
(women prisoners denied meaningful access to courts; equal protection claim not
reached); Kendrick v. Bland, 586 F. Supp. 1536, 1551-52 (W.D. Ky. 1983) (attorneys
required at women's prison because of absence of writ writers); Clover v. Johnson, 478
F. Supp. 1075, 1096-97 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (paralegal training required at women's
prison); Wade v. Kane, 448 F. Supp. 678, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mene., 591 F.2d 1338
(3d Cir. 1979) (inmate legal clinic required to remain open to assist illiterate and Span-
ish-speaking prisoners).
51. See supra text accompanying notes 29-37.
52. See Mello, supra note 5, at 832-35. See generally Brief of the American Bar Ass'n as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 303 (1988)
(No. 88-411).
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proceeding.5" Usually the jurisdiction of a court or an administra-
tive agency has been invoked and a hearing is or will be scheduled.
The question is whether the litigant is entitled to legal help at that
hearing. In over a century of procedural due process cases, the
Supreme Court has identified a variety of due process values54 that
help answer this question. These differing values have generated a
succession of standards for determining due process,55 the enduring
hallmark of which is its flexibility. 56 Indeed, flexibility is its birth-
mark as well.
The right to due process "antedates the establishment of our
institutions."5 As has been recounted often, the parent of the due
process clauses in our Constitution is the "law of the land" provi-
sion of the thirty-ninth chapter of the Magna Carta.5 A respected
53. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32-33 (198 1) (coun-
sel for indigent parent in proceeding to terminate parental status not always required
where proceeding is informal and questions presented are uncomplicated); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-49 (1976) (evidentiary hearing not required prior to termi-
nation of disability benefits where administrative procedures comport with due process);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70 (1974) (prison disciplinary proceedings re-
sulting in loss of good time credit or imposition of solitary confinement require written
notice of claimed violation, 24-hour delay before hearing, written statement of
factfinders, and restricted opportunity to call witnesses as well as assistance to illiterate
inmates); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486-89 (1972) (parole revocation hearing
requires probable cause determination, written notice, disclosure of evidence, opportu-
nity to be heard and call witnesses, confrontation and cross-examination of adverse wit-
nesses, and written statement by neutral factfinder); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
266-70 (1970) (pretermination hearing required when public assistance payments dis-
continued; retained counsel allowed); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (fun-
damental requisite of due process of law is opportunity to be heard).
54. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 10-7, at 663-77 (analyzing due process cases with refer-
ence to their recognition of the intrinsic--"the right to be heard from, and the right to
be told why"-and instrumental-"the right to secure a different outcome"--values of
due process); Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor AdninistratiieAdjiidication
in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theorl of Palue, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28,
47 n.61 (1976) (describing the incorporation of"[d]ignitary or natural right, utilitarian,
and egalitarian theories" in the due process cases).
55. See irafra text accompanying notes 60-82.
56. " '[Djue process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical concept with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances . . . . '[DJue process' cannot be im-
prisoned within the treacherous limits of any formula." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
57. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 539 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
58. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 276 (1885). See also Hurtado, 1 10 U.S. at 543 (Harlan,J., dissenting) ("Whether the
phrase in our American constitutions, national or State, be 'law of the land' or 'due
process of law,' it means in every case the same thing." (citation omitted)); Davidson v.
New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 101 (1877) ("The equivalent of the phrase 'due process of
law,' according to Lord Coke, is found in the words 'law of the land,' in the Great Char-
ter, in connection with the writ of habeas corpus, the trial by jury, and other guarantees
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English translation of vel ser legem terre, the "law of the land" provi-
sion, holds that it guarantees a "legal process or proceeding" that is
"adapted by the law to the nature of the case." 59 The Supreme Court's
procedural due process decisions evidence this context-specific
sensitivity.
In one of its earliest cases involving the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause, Hurtado v. California,60 the Supreme
Court acknowledged the important role of history in giving meaning
to due process, 6' but rejected the argument that its source, the
Magna Carta, froze the process constitutionally due American liti-
gants in the forms provided by English common law.6" The Court
observed that "flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation"
are the essential characteristics of both the Magna Carta and the
common-law method that gives meaning to its descendant, due pro-
cess.6 3 The Court added that the Constitution "was made for an
undefined and expanding future" and that "[tihere is nothing in
Magna Charta, rightly construed as a broad charter of public right
and law, which ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems and
every age.""'
Consistent with this historical focus on flexibility, the Supreme
Court has crafted elastic tests to answer both questions that were
intertwined in its early due process cases, 6 5 and have been separated
in its more recent cases: (1) what interests are protected by due
process, and (2) what process is due the interest-holders to protect
those interests.
of the rights of the subject against the oppression of the crown."). See generally Berger,
"Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1979).
59. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 527 (citation omitted; emphasis added). In Bank of Colum-
bia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819), the Court gave a similarly fluid meaning to
the words of the Magna Carta, observing that "they were intended to secure the individ-
ual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the estab-
lished principles of private rights and distributive justice." Id. at 244.
60. 110 U.S. 516 (1884). In Hurtado the Court held that a capital defendant was not
constitutionally entitled to have a grand jury find that a murder charge was supported by
probable cause. Id. at 538.
61. Cf. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 277 (Due process obtains its meaning from "those
settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of Eng-
land, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been
unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the
settlement of this country."). See generally Kadish, Iethodology and Criteria in Due Process
Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
62. 110 U.S. at 528.
63. Id. at 530.
64. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884).
65. The early due process analysis collapsed the two questions into a "one step [ana-
lytic] process." L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 10-8, at 678.
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One early test of the liberty interests that were protected by due
process was whether a principle was "fundamental" and advanced
the "liberty and justice" that "lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions."' 66 Once a protected interest was identified,
another early test used to determine the process government owed
the interest-holder was similarly general; for example, the process
that was required to. protect some interest-holders was one that
"hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and ren-
ders judgment only after a trial." 67
The definition of a liberty interest protected by due process has
retained its flexibility for over a century. In 1923, for example, the
Court held unconstitutional a state law forbidding the teaching of a
modern language other than English in private and public schools.6 8
The Court reasoned that the law denied children the right to "ac-
quire useful knowledge" 69 and denied parents the means to dis-
charge their "natural duty" to provide their children with an
"education suitable to their station in life." 7 The Court spoke ex-
pansively about the "liberty" guaranteed by due process:
[It] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any
of the common occupations of life ... to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 7'
In the decisions in which the Court struggled to define an ac-
ceptable standard that determined which provisions of the Bill of
Rights were "incorporated"-made effective against the states-by
the fourteenth amendment's promise of due process, the Court
asked whether an asserted liberty interest was a component of "the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."72 It measured the
66. 110 U.S. at 535.
67. See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 581 (1819) (argu-
ment of Daniel Webster).
68. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
69. Id. at 399.
70. Id. at 400.
71. Id. at 399 (citations omitted; emphasis added). See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1977), in which the Court cited Meyer with approval, noting that the many "com-
mon law privileges" that the Meyer Court recognized as protected liberty interests in-
cluded a child's interest in avoiding "unjustified intrusions on personal security." Id. at
673 (footnote omitted).
72. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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constitutionality of the process provided by a state to protect an ac-
cepted liberty interest by asking whether the process "offend[ed]
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English-speaking peoples.""3
In the 1970s the number of protected interests grew signifi-
cantly. For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly7l the Court required the
State to provide public assistance recipients with a hearing prior to
terminating their statutory benefits, signaling a decade of decisions
that included within the interests protected by due process interests
in "benefits," statutory "entitlements, ' 75 and "mutually explicit
understandings.' '76
Although these interests have been constricted by the decisions
of the last decade,7 7 the more limited and utilitarian due process test
that the Supreme Court currently employs still recognizes a variety
of protected "liberty interests. ' 8
The Supreme Court's current due process test embraces a two-
step analysis. First, the Court determines whether there is a
"threshold interest" that due process protects. If so, the Court asks
what process is due the litigent. In answering this second question,
the Court employs a three-factor balancing test:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
73. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
74. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
75. Id. at 262. See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) ("Suspension of
issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the
licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural
due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment." (citations omitted)).
76. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
77. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 90.
78. One authority, summarizing the Supreme Court's decisions, said:
While the Court has not defined the exact scope of the liberties which are pro-
tected by the due process clauses, it is clear that they go beyond mere physical
restraint or fundamental constitutional rights. The clauses also guarantee that
each individual will have some degree of freedom of choice and action in all
important personal matters.
It would appear that whenever the government takes an action which is
designed to deprive an individual ... of the freedom to engage in some signifi-
cant area of human activity, some procedure to determine the factual basis and
legality for such action being taken is required by the due process clause.
2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUrIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 17.4, at 226-27 (1986) [hereinafter ROTUNDA].
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the function involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute procedural require-
ments would entail. 9
With respect to the provision of counsel, the Court begins its
analysis with some assumptions and also a more formal presump-
tion. The Court has said that the weighty individual interest in per-
sonal freedom presumptively tips the balance. Hence, if the
underlying civil proceeding may result in the loss of personal free-
dom, the Court's weighing process is aided by a presumption that
the litigant is entitled to counsel. 80
The Court also assumes that the more formally adversarial the
proceeding, the more likely the risk of error if one side is unrepre-
sented.8 This builds upon the basic assumption of the adversary
process that a just result is produced by a vigorous contest of
equally qualified opponents. The risk of error is most acute when a
powerful governmental advocate opposes an unrepresented litigant
in an adversarial proceeding.
82
III. UNIFYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF LEGAL
HELP IN CIVIL CASES: THE DUE PROCESS-ACCESS
TO COURT RIGHT
The Supreme Court has yet to recognize explicitly that the ana-
lytic framework of the access to court and procedural due process
cases is the same. It should do so in Giarratano. The analyses ad-
79. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (citation omitted).
80. This presumption was stated by the Supreme Court as follows:
[T]he Court's precedents speak with one voice about what "fundamental fair-
ness" has meant when the Court has considered the right to appointed counsel,
and we draw from them the presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to
appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical
liberty. It is against this presumption that all the other elements in the due
process decision must be measured.
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981). See also Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973); In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 41 (1967).
81. See, e.g., Gault. 387 U.S. at 36 ("The probation officer cannot act as counsel for
the child. His role in the adjudicatory hearing . . . is as arresting officer and witness
against the child. Nor can the judge represent the child. There is no material difference
in this respect between adult and juvenile proceedings of the sort here involved."). Cf
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28 ("If, as our adversary system presupposes, accurate and just re-
sults are most likely to be obtained through the equal contest of opposed interests, the
State's interest in the child's welfare may perhaps best be served by a hearing in which
both the parent and the State acting for the child are represented by counsel, without
whom the contest of interests might become unwholesomely equal.").
82. See Michelman-Part I, supra note 2, at 1177-78; Note, supra note 2, at 1297
(heightened due process safeguards are required when an individual faces the
government).
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dress variants of the same question: when is there a constitutional
right to legal help in civil cases? These qualified rights to legal help
are the indispensable means by which both sets of right-holders vin-
dicate fundamental underlying rights. One guarantees "meaningful
access"83 to the courts; the other guarantees an "opportunity to be
heard '84 once access is obtained. They are the beginning and end
of the same constitutional promise.
Merging the two concepts does not require the Court to import
an analytic framework from the procedural due process cases that is
foreign to the access to court analysis. Rather, it requires only ex-
plicit recognition of what is inescapably implicit. For in the access
cases the Court implicitly has applied a procedural due process
analysis.
A. The Bounds Court Identified Constitutionally
Protected Liberty Interests
The first step in the Bounds Court analysis was the identification
of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. The Bounds Court
held that a noncapital prisoner's interests in "habeas corpus and
civil rights actions" are constitutionally adequate threshold liberty
interests to command affirmative "measures" to protect them.8 5
The plain import of Bounds is that these interests are constitutionally
protected liberty interests. They meet the first test in the two-step
due process analysis and, therefore, trigger the balancing test that
determines the assistance-usually a law library in the prison con-
text-that the state must provide to safeguard these interests.
Why are a noncapital prisoner's interests in habeas corpus and
civil rights actions protected liberty interests? They are protected
because "original actions seeking new trials, release from confine-
ment, or vindication of fundamental civil rights," which "frequently
raise heretofore unlitigated issues, . . . directly protect our most val-
ued rights." 6 Habeas corpus and civil rights actions are the en-
forcement mechanisms for protecting these rights.
When a petitioner files a federal habeas corpus or state post-
conviction proceeding in which the petitioner seeks to vindicate a
fair trial right, the petitioner's ultimate interest is in the "uncondi-
tional liberty" to which the prisoner had a pre-existing right, and
83. Bounds v, Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1979).
84. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).




has an existing right, if the fair trial claim is meritorious. The fair
trial right and the unconditional liberty interest it protects are de-
rived explicitly from the Constitution and the centuries of common
law that give meaning to "due process. "87
Concededly, a criminal conviction affirmed on direct appeal,
however illegal or unconstitutional it allegedly may be, creates a pre-
sumption that the resulting denial of unconditional liberty is valid."8
This presumption properly allocates the burden of proof to the peti-
tioner.8" But this presumption is not irrebuttable and it does not
diminish the interest in the claim that it was wrongfully taken. 0
87. See, e.g., Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty " in Those Clauses in the Fed-
eral and State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property", 4 HARV. L. REv. 365
(1891).
88. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) ("When the process of direct re-
view ... comes to an end, a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the convic-
tion and sentence."). For a discussion of Barefoot, see infra text accompanying notes 199-
207.
89. See, e.g., D. WILKEs, JR., supra note 9, § 1-7, at 7-8 (standard of proof in post-
conviction proceedings is generally preponderance of the evidence).
90. If the criminal conviction is in fact invalid because unconstitutionally obtained,
the prisoner's liberty interest is "unconditional" in the sense that the state cannot ille-
gally impose any restraint, including incarceration, on personal liberty.
The asserted invalidity of the state's authority to incarcerate distinguishes this inter-
est in unconditional liberty from two other possible types of liberty, "conditional" and
"aspirational." Prisoners enjoy a state-created interest in conditional liberty when the
state, after obtaining a valid criminal conviction, voluntarily chooses to grant prisoners
freedom despite its legitimate authority to impose or continue incarceration. The
Supreme Court has held that this lesser liberty interest, triggered by a court's decision
to place a convicted'person on probation or by the state's decision to grant parole, is
entitled to some due process protection. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
The interest in unconditional liberty differs even more fundamentally from an inter-
est in "aspirational liberty," which consists merely of a prisoner's desire to be free de-
spite the fact that the state has obtained a valid criminal conviction and has chosen to
exercise, not to forego, its legitimate authority to require or maintain his or her incarcer-
ation. The Supreme Court consistently has rejected the claim that aspirational liberty
triggers procedural due process protection, holding that no protectable liberty interest
is created by an executory parole release decision that was reversed before the prisoner
was released, see Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 21 (1982); a "[prisoner's] appeal for
clemency," see Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981); the
"possibility" of discretionary release on parole, see Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal In-
mates, 442 U.S. I, 11 (1979); but see id. at 12 (finding a protected threshold liberty inter-
est in specific statutory language that provided more than a unilateral expectation of
release upon good behavior); or a prisoner's hopes that he or she would be allowed to
remain in either a lesser security institution within a prison system, see Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976), or within any particular prison itself, see Montanye v. Haymes,
427 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1976). The Court refused to give these interests constitutionally
protected threshold status because the prisoners had no pre-existing right or entitle-
ment to, or reasonable expectation that they would receive, the forms of liberty in which
they asserted interest. That is, the release decisions were subjective, discretionary, or
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In holding unconstitutional the requirement that indigent pris-
oners pay a fee to file a state post-conviction petition, the Supreme
Court, prior to Bounds, emphasized the fundamental interest in the
restoration of unconditional liberty that survives conviction and ap-
peal and is protected both by federal habeas corpus and state post-
conviction proceedings:
Ever since the Magna Charta, man's greatest right-per-
sonal liberty-has been guaranteed, and the procedures of
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 gave to every Englishman a
prompt and effective remedy for testing the legality of his
imprisonment. Considered by the Founders as the highest
safeguard of liberty, it was written into the Constitution of
the United States that its "privilege . . . shall not be sus-
pended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the
public safety may require it." Art. I § 9. Its principle is
imbedded in the fundamental law of 47 of our States. It
has long been available in the federal courts to indigent
prisoners of both the State and Federal Governments to
test the validity of their detention. Over the centuries it
has been the common law world's "freedom writ" by
whose orderly processes the production of a prisoner in
court may be required and the legality of the grounds for
his incarceration inquired into, failing which the prisoner is
set free. We repeat what has been so truly said of the fed-
eral writ: "there is no higher duty than to maintain it
unimpaired" and unsuspended, save only in the cases spec-
ified in our Constitution. When an equivalent right is
granted by a State, financial hurdles must not be permitted
to condition its exercise.9 '
In sum, Bounds properly gave the prisoner's liberty interest in
"original proceedings seeking new trials," and the unconditional
liberty such proceedings may restore, constitutionally protected
status.92
predictive decisions that were not based upon enforceable criteria. See L. TRIBE, supra
note 2, § 10-10, at 694-96.
Hence, while a valid conviction extinguishes a prisoner's interest in unconditional
liberty, and leaves him or her with only the lesser interests of conditional or aspirational
liberty, the prisoner's interest in unconditional liberty remains active so long as he or
she has a claim that the underlying conviction actually is not valid.
91. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712-13 (1961) (footnote and citation omitted;
emphasis added). For the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, see 31 Car. 2, ch. 2.
92. By comparison, that interest is at least as substantial as an organization's interest
in preventing the government from labeling the organization "communist," see Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 175 (1951) (DouglasJ., concur-
ring); a student's interest in avoiding a disciplinary "paddling," see Ingraham v. Wright,
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B. The Bounds Court Implicitly Performed A Procedural
Due Process Balancing Test
Having identified the requisite threshold liberty interests, the
Court in Bounds then performed a procedural due process balancing
test without explicitly referring to it as such. It again gave great
weight to the prisoner's private interest in habeas corpus and civil
rights claims,"3 declined to give much weight to the State's contrary
interest in avoiding expenditures,9 4 and found that, without law
books or legal assistance, there was an increased risk of error: valid
claims would be lost because they would not be pled properly.95
Moreover, while the Bounds Court did not expressly identify it as a
procedural due process assumption, it also emphasized that govern-
ment, with its formidable powers, is the adversary in both habeas
corpus and civil rights actions. 6
430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977); a prisoner's interest in avoiding the loss of "good time" cred-
its that would reduce the length of his or her incarceration, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 558 (1974); a parent's interest in avoiding termination of his or her parental
status, see Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); or a prisoner's
interest in avoiding "adverse social consequences" such as "stigma" and "compelled
treatment" that accompany transfer to a mental institution, see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480, 492-93 (1980). With respect to the latter case, it would be fundamentally irrational
if the transfer of a prisoner to a mental institution triggers a right to legal help (state-
appointed counsel in the view of four of the justices in the plurality, see 445 U.S. at 496-
97), but the death-sentenced prisoner's interest in capital post-conviction litigation does
not.
93. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827-28 (1977).
94. Id. at 825 ("[E]conomic factors may... be considered, for example, in choosing
the methods used to provide meaningful access. But the cost of protecting a constitu-
tional right cannot justify its total denial.").
95. Id. at 825-28 (emphasizing prisoner's need to know law to understand whether a
colorable claim exists; to plead "jurisdiction, venue, standing, exhaustion of remedies,
proper parties plaintiff and defendant," to assess whether new legal principles apply
retroactively, to respond to state pleadings, thus avoiding di.smissal of valid claims).
In Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), the Court implicitly engaged in the same
procedural due process analysis, identifying and balancing the same interests. It ac-
cepted that prison "writ writers" "are sometimes a menace to prison discipline" and are
often so "unskillful" that their petitions unduly "burden" the courts. Id. at 488. But the
Court found that implementing the access right and vindicating the "fundamental"
claims that it protects outweigh the admittedly significant state interests. Id. at 488-90.
Similarly, in Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd sub nom.
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam), the lower court identified the
"imperative" prisoner interest in effective access to the courts and the real risk that pro se
litigants would lose valid constitutional claims that they could not articulate and plead
without help. Id. at 109-10. It weighed these interests against the "insufficient" as-
serted state interests in "economy and standardization." Id. at I 1l.
96. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 826 ("[Ijf the State files a response to a pro se pleading, it
will undoubtedly contain seemingly authoritative citations. Without a library, an inmate
will be unable to rebut the State's argument."). See also Note, supra note 2, at 1297 ("The
state government, as a litigant, has superior power to control procedures and share evi-
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IV. THE DEATH-SENTENCED PRISONERS' RIGHT TO COUNSEL TO
INVESTIGATE, PREPARE, AND ASSERT POST-CONVICTION
CLAIMS: AN APPLICATION OF THE DUE PROCESS-
GROUNDED ACCESS TO COURT RIGHT
The context-specific, coherent right to counsel recognized in
Giarratano9 7 derives, as it should, from the special circumstances of
capital post-conviction petitioners and the extraordinary signifi-
cance of capital post-conviction proceedings.8
dence, and typically has greater litigational resources than does its individual
opponent.").
97. It is the right to the assistance of counsel in investigating, preparing, and litigat-
ing capital post-conviction claims in state proceedings. 847 F.2d 1118, 1121-22 (4th
Cir. 1988) (en banc). See also supra note 10.
98. The eroded distinction between "civil" and "criminal" cases should not deter-
mine whether there is a right to counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings. Post-
conviction proceedings are called by both names. D. WILKES, JR., supra note 9, at 283
app. A. Thus, insofar as the labels are significant, post-conviction's label is ambiguous.
Its true identity is a hybrid. The post-conviction process enforces constitutional
criminal trial rights, restores unconditional liberty, and sometimes shares the qualities of
a criminal appeal. See infra text accompanying notes 116-120. It has become a more
integral part of the criminal process. See infra note 119. In these respects, its identity
evokes the spirit and an important interest in the letter of the right to counsel provision
of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. See infra text accompanying
notes 263-286.
On the other hand, in a post-conviction proceeding the prisoner is the petitioner
and has the burden of proving constitutional violations, usually by a preponderance of
the evidence. D. WILKES,JR., supra note 9, § 1-7, at 7-8. It also is an integral part of the
collateral process that includes federal habeas corpus proceedings, which have been tra-
ditionally considered civil in nature. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423-24 (1963). Gener-
ally, habeas corpus petitioners cannot raise federal claims in federal court unless they
have "exhausted" them in-presented them to-an appropriate state court. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1982). Thus, those federal claims that cannot be asserted on the
direct appeal of a state case must be presented to a state post-conviction court. Con-
versely, if they are not presented to the state post-conviction court, generally they are
waived and may not be presented to the federal habeas corpus court. See D. WILKES, JR.,
supra note 9, § 8-24, at 193-201. In this sense, state post-conviction is a civil proceeding
that is shaped by its criminal law enforcement function.
The more appropriate "right to counsel" inquiries are not whether the proceeding
is denominated "civil" or "criminal," but whether the liberty interests which are the
subject of adjudication or agency action are important enough to warrant the protec-
tions provided by counsel, whether there are strong countervailing state interests, and
whether the risk of error attendant to pro se representation is tolerable. See, e.g., Allen v.
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); It re Gault,
387 U.S. I (1967). The answers to these questions resolve the right to counsel issue
when it implicates the due process clause as well as define the scope of the right to
counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment. See iifra text accompanying notes 263-286.
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A. The Private Interest
The weighty private interest that death-sentenced prisoners
have in the automatic appointment of post-conviction counsel is a
more substantial variant of that identified in Bounds. It is the interest
in vindicating, in an original action, a capital fair trial claim that, if
successful, may preserve life. This interest both satisfies the thresh-
old due process requirement and weighs heavily in the balancing
test.
1. The Immediate Private Interest in Capital Post-conviction Proceed-
ings.-a. The Interest in the Enhanced Capital Fair Trial Right.-A capital
post-conviction proceeding often restores a capital defendant's con-
stitutional right to a fair capital trial and sentencing proceeding
when it has been denied."9 It is, for example, the usual means by
which a capital post-conviction petitioner enforces his or her right
to effective assistance of counsel. This right is the predicate of a fair
trial.' 0 0 A capital proceeding is vigorously adversarial. The proce-
dural protections made available to capital defendants are enhanced
to assure the "reliability" and "certainty" that are premises of the
constitutionality of the death penalty.' If defense counsel's per-
formance falls below constitutionally imposed minimal standards
and prejudices the result of a capital proceeding, 0 2 a defendant has
been denied his most basic right.
Other constitutionally imposed assumptions also bolster the
foundations of the'fair trial right. One assumption is that prosecu-
tors will disclose exculpatory evidence to defense counsel, as re-
99. See cases cited infra notes 108-112.
100. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) ("An accused is entitled
to be assisted by an attorney ... who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is
fair."). Strickland grounded the effective assistance requirement in the adversarial system
recognized by the sixth amendment as a whole, not just on the counsel clause. Id. at
684-85.
Because trial counsel are disinclined to attack their own competency and because
proof that trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective often depends on what was not
done-omissions that are not reflected in the trial record-trial and direct appeal courts
usually are unable to enforce this fundamental right. Indeed, whether trial counsel was
constitutionally effective normally is not an issue that can even be raised on direct ap-
peal. See cases cited infra note 116.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 154-194.
102. The Strickland Court stated that a capital sentencing proceeding is "sufficiently
like a trial in its adversarial format . . . [so] that counsel's role in the proceeding is
comparable to counsel's role at trial-to ensure that the adversarial testing process
works to produce a just result under the standards governing decision." 466 U.S. at
686-87 (citations omitted).
478 [VOL. 48:455
19891 STATE POST-CONVICTION RIGHT To COUNSEL 479
quired by Brady v. Maryland '  and its progeny. 10 4 Another
assumption is that the state will not engage in secret misconduct
that prejudices the fair trial right.' 0 5
The successful capital post-conviction cases provide evidence of
the extraordinary value of both the state (and interrelated fed-
eral'0 6 ) post-conviction enforcement mechanism and the enhanced
capital fair trial rights that it enforces. 10 7 These cases also demon-
strate the need for appointed counsel; they identify a range of com-
plex investigative, legal research, and litigation tasks that pro se
litigants simply cannot manage.
Capital post-conviction attorneys have discovered nonrecord
facts that established prejudicial misconduct by the state' ° and vio-
lations of the constitutionally imposed disclosure rule in Brady v.
Maryland;' 9 these discoveries have required reversals of a signifi-
cant number of death penalties. Capital post-conviction attorneys
have demonstrated the ineffectiveness of trial counsel by discover-
ing evidence of the defendant's mental illness and disorder," t0
103. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (constitutional error
exists and conviction must be reversed if evidence is material in sense that its suppres-
sion by prosecution undermines confidence in outcome of trial); United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 114 (1976) (prosecutor's failure to disclose victim's prior criminal record
did not raise sufficient doubt as to respondent's guilt); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154-55 (1972) (prosecutor's promise of leniency to key witness important evidence
of non-credibility of witness; failure to disclose required new trial).
105. See, e.g., Amadeo v. Zant, 108 S. Ct. 1771, 1774 (1988).
106. See supra note 98.
107. See cases cited infra notes 108-112.
108. See, e.g., Amadeo, 108 S. Ct. at 1774 (discovery of document in which prosecutor
directed jury commissioner to discriminate against blacks and women in compiling jury
lists required reversal of death penalty); Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1464-66
(1 th Cir. 1986) (discovery of prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony required
reversal of death penalty).
109. 373 U.S. 83. 86 (1963). See, e.g., McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945, 950-51 (4th
Cir. 1988) (discovery of failure of prosecutor to disclose, inter alia, police report indicat-
ing sole eyewitness to capital murder initially had identified assailant as white male re-
quired reversal of death penalty imposed against black male defendant); Lindsey v.
King, 769 F.2d 1034, 1042-43 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (discovery of failure of prosecu-
tor to disclose a police report indicating eyewitness had initially been unable to identify
capital defendant required reversal of death penalty); Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334,
1357-58 (10th Cir. 1984) (discovery of prosecutor's failure to disclose potentially miti-
gating Federal Bureau of Investigation reports required reversal of death penalty).
110. See, e.g., Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631, 639 (9th Cir. 1988) (discovery of evidence
indicating that defendant had been suicidal and mentally ill established ineffective assist-
ance of counsel, requiring reversal of death penalty); Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d
491, 494-95 (11 th Cir. 1988) (discovery of evidence of mental illness and other mitigat-
ing circumstances, including a discharge summary from a state mental hospital, the testi-
mony of two psychiatrists, and records from various juvenile services agencies and a
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mental retardation,"' and other compelling mitigating circum-
stances.' 12 They have retained and consulted the experts whose tes-
timony often is essential to establish the ineffectiveness of trial
counsel."' They have reduced these facts and expert opinions to
writing and pled them in the carefully drawn post-conviction peti-
tions and supporting affidavits that are required to adequately raise
state post-conviction claims and preserve them for federal habeas
corpus review.'" They have argued.points of law and participated
prison health services division, supported finding of ineffective assistance of counsel,
requiring reversal of the death penalty); Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 642, 652-55 (11 th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 189 (1988) (discovery of evidence of mental illness
supported finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring reversal of death pen-
alty); Holmes v. State, 429 So. 2d 297, 300-01 (Fla. 1983) (failure of trial counsel to
produce existing evidence of "psychological disturbance" was constitutionally ineffec-
tive, requiring reversal of death penalty); Curry v. Zant, 371 S.E.2d 647, 649 (Ga. 1988)
(new evidence from three mental health experts and other witnesses demonstrated
mental retardation and mental illness, supporting finding of ineffective assistance of
counsel and requiring that guilty plea and death sentence be set aside).
111. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430, 1432-33, 1436 (11th Cir. 1987)
(discovery of evidence demonstrating epilepsy and mental retardation helped establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring reversal of death penalty); Jones v. Thigpen,
555 F. Supp. 870, 879-80 (S.D. Miss. 1983), modifiedon other grounds, 741 F.2d 805 (5th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1087 (1987) (discovery of evidence of mental retardation
helped establish ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring reversal of death penalty).
112. See, e.g., Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322, 1324-25 (11 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 996 (1986) (testimony of high school faculty members about mental and physi-
cal abuse of capital defendant by parents along with other evidence indicating he was a
slow learner, hard worker and mentally ill, established ineffective assistance of counsel,
requiring reversal of death penalty); Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 745-46.(11 th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026 (1986) (discovery of mitigating evidence that capital
defendant had no criminal record, had a good work record, had been abused by her
husband, and was a good mother established ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring
reversal of death penalty); People v. Ledesma, 43 Cal. 3d 171, 223, 729 P.2d 839, 872,
233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 437 (1987) (trial counsel failed to investigate evidence of drug-in-
duced diminished capacity, demonstrating ineffective assistance and requiring vacation
of death-sentenced petitioner's conviction); People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 164, 599
P.2d 587, 599-600, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 293 (1979) (same); Zant v. Hamilton, 251 Ga.
553, 555, 307 S.E.2d 667, 669 (1983) (failure to provide testimony of relatives at sen-
tencing proceeding established ineffective assistance, requiring reversal of death
penalty).
113. See, e.g., Middleton, 849 F.2d at 494 (testimony of psychiatrist and lawyer); Arni-
strong, 833 F.2d at 1434 (testimony of an expert on mental retardation and brain dam-
age); Thomas, 796 F.2d at 1325 (testimony of psychiatrist); Curn, 371 S.E.2d at 648-49
(testimony of mental health experts).
114. Failure to preserve the claim can be disastrous. In Smith v. Baker, 624 F. Supp.
1075 (E.D. Va. 1985), a pro se noncapital habeas corpus petitioner's failure to coherently
state a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his first petition in the state
courts led the Virginia Supreme Court to reject his "successor" petition on the ground
that the petitioner had knowledge of the facts upon which he based the claim at the time
he filed his first petition. This in turn led the federal district court to conclude that the
Virginia court's finding of a procedural bar was an adequate and independent state
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in vigorously adversarial post-conviction evidentiary hearings in
both state and federal courts." 5
b. The Interest In the Post-conviction Enforcement Device.-It is by
filing a post-conviction petition, not through a direct appeal, that a
(represented) capital defendant can enforce a fair trial right when,
as is frequently the case, the facts that establish denial of the right
are not in the record or if they are, the alleged denial of the right is
not an issue that can be raised on direct appeal."6 In these in-
stances, the post-conviction proceeding is the first means of vindi-
cating such fair trial rights. A post-conviction proceeding is even
more important than a direct appeal when a fair trial claim asserted
in it, unlike claims usually asserted on direct appeal, has not been
presented to any court before, even the trial court.
Although the Supreme Court has held that a direct appeal is
not constitutionally compelled,' '7 and never has held that a state
post-conviction proceeding is required,' each, depending upon
ground prohibiting federal habeas corpus review of the merits. Id. at 1077-78. See also
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977) (failure to make timely objection to
admission of inculpatory statement may bar federal habeas corpus review of .iranda
claim).
115. See, e.g., Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631, 639 (9th Cir. 1988) (state post-conviction
and federal habeas corpus hearings); Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 642, 652-55 (11 th Cir.
1988) (same); Lindsey v. King, 769 F.2d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (federal
habeas corpus hearing wherein court-appointed attorney cross-examined state prosecu-
tor, revealing Brady violation).
116. See Blanco v. Wainwright, 507 So. 2d 1377, 1384 (Fla. 1987) (rarely can ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel be raised on direct appeal since claim usually is dependent on
nonrecord facts); State v. Williamson, 389 So. 2d 1328, 1331 & n.5 (La. 1980) (ineffec-
tive assistance claims heard on habeas corpus review because of focus on nonrecord
facts); Payne v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 765, 768 (Va. App. 1988) (ineffective assist-
ance of counsel usually not cognizable on direct appeal because facts relevant to claim
not contained in trial record and trial counsel had no opportunity to defend or explain
conduct); State v. Byrd, 30 Wash. App. 794. 800, 638 P.2d 601, 605 (1981) ("personal
restraint petition" rather than direct appeal appropriate means for asserting ineffective
assistance of counsel when claim based on nonrecord facts). See generally D. WILKES,JR.,
supra note 9, at 264 app. A. See also Atkinson v. United States, 366 A.2d 450, 452-53
(D.C. 1976) (motion for relief from sentence appropriate where errors are not correcta-
ble on direct appeal or where "exceptional circumstances" exist); McCrae v. State, 437
So. 2d 1388, 1390 (Fla. 1983) (matters raised on appeal or which could have been raised
on appeal not cognizable on motion for post-conviction relief).
117. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). VcKane stated that "review by an
appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case... was not at common law, and
is not now, a necessary element of due process of law. It is wholly within the discretion
of the state to allow or not to allow such a review." Id. at 687. But "fe]ven though states
may not be required to create an appellate system, any appellate system must comply
with the principles of due process." 2 ROTUNDA, supra note 78, § 17.9, at 273 n.15 (cit-
ing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)).
118. In Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949). the Court faced the "recurring problem
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the claim, is the means of restoring the constitutional right to a fair
trial when it is-denied. Both have become "integral part[s] of the
...system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a de-
fendant.,"I" In both, issues that are not preserved may not be fur-
ther reviewed; death-sentenced prisoners may assert on appeal only
those claims that they have properly preserved at trial; death-sen-
tenced prisoners may assert in federal habeas corpus proceedings
only those issues that have been first raised in state post-conviction
hearings. 2 0 Thus, the ability of a death-sentenced prisoner to effec-
tively investigate, evaluate, and assert state post-conviction claims
very directly affects not only the prisoner's chance to immediately
vindicate his or her fair trial right but also his or her ability to pre-
serve fair trial issues for later consideration by a federal court.
In the vast majority of criminal appeals, resolution of issues will
not have life and death consequences. It always will have such con-
sequences in capital post-conviction proceedings. Yet there is a con-
stitutional right to counsel in all direct appeals from criminal
convictions in noncapital as well as capital cases.' 2 '
There obviously are differences between direct appeals and
post-conviction proceedings; more issues can be raised on direct ap-
peal, and this is the more common means of correcting unconstitu-
tional trial errors.' 2 2 That "norm," however, is of little solace to a
of determining what, if any, is the appropriate post-trial procedure in Illinois by which
claims of infringement of federal rights may be raised." Id. at 236. The Court indicated
"that prisoners [must] be given some clearly defined method by which they may raise
claims of denial of federal rights," stating that this "requirement must be met." Id. at
239. Because of an apparent change, however, in the state court's interpretation of its
habeas corpus provisions, the court did not have to rule on this issue. Bil see Penn-
sylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), in which the Court noted that "[s]tates have no
obligation to provide [post-conviction] relief .... " Id. at 557 (citing United States v.
MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323 (1976)). For a discussion of Finley, see infra text accom-
panying notes 306-326.
119. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion) (describing ap-
pellate review). See A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES I (Tent. Draft 1967) ("Postconvic-
tion review has become an established part of the criminal process."). The Court in
Bounds recognized the integral role of the. post-conviction process when it noted that
among the most vital underlying claims that are protected by the access right are "unliti-
gated issues" raised in "original" actions. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977).
See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
120. See supra note 114.
121. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963). In rejecting the argument
that the discretionary appointment of counsel to indigents on appeal was adequate, the
Court said that "[wihen an indigent is forced to run this gauntlet of a preliminary show-
ing of merit, the right to appeal does not comport with fair procedure." Id.
122. See, e.g.., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887-88 (1983).
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death-sentenced prisoner who cannot complain on direct appeal that
nonrecord facts establish that his or her lawyer "was not functioning
as the 'counsel' guaranteed... by the Sixth Amendment"' 23 during
his or her capital trial or sentencing proceeding, or that the prosecu-
tor had secretly directed the jury commissioner to discriminate
against blacks and women,' 24 or that the prosecutor withheld evi-
dence that indicated he or she should not have been convicted or
given the death penalty.' 25  Such "collateral" challenges by repre-
sented death-sentenced prisoners often have been the means by
which courts enforced these enhanced capital fair trial-rights: 2 6
2. The Ultimate Private Interest in Capital Post-conviction Proceed-
ings.-While both prisoners and society have compelling interests in
the enforcement of constitutional guarantees, the ultimate interest
of a capital post-conviction petitioner is far more tangible: the in-
comparable interest in life. This interest readily distinguishes capi-
tal and noncapital post-conviction cases. 127  It is a far greater
interest than those to which the Bounds Court gave constitutional
123. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
124. Amadeo v. Zant, 108 S. Ct. 1771, 1780 (1988).
125. See cases cited supra note 109.
126. See Mello, infra note 142, at 521 (indicating 60 to 73.2% success rate in "capital
habeas" litigation in federal courts during 1976-1986). See also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880, 915 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Elxperience shows that prisoners on
death row have succeeded in an extraordinary number of their appeals."); Greenberg,
Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 917-18 (1982). There do not appear to
be comparable data indicating the success rate in state capital post-conviction
proceedings.
127. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in
degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its
rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice.
And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in
our concept of humanity.
Id. For other important distinctions between prisoner interests in capital and noncapital
post-conviction proceedings, see supra text accompanying notes 99-115 & infla text ac-
companying notes 128-134. There are still additional distinctions, however, that often
are obscured by the stark life and death dichotomy. Noncapital prisoners usually have a
lifetime, or at least a significant part of it, to develop and assert a post-conviction claim.
If they belatedly unearth compelling evidence of innocence, they generally can belatedly
seek to prove it in court. They can ameliorate the loss of a fair trial right in a number of
ways other than by filing a post-conviction petition. They can seek parole, participate in
work and other release programs that incrementally restore their freedom, and develop
a record of prison accomplishments that over the years may earn them a pardon or
commutation (as well as parole). The nature of the death penalty places these remedies
well out of the reach of death-sentenced prisoners and therefore underscores and




protection as threshold liberty interests.' 28
The Supreme Court has incorporated the extraordinary value
of life in its death penalty jurisprudence. To reduce the risk of un-
constitutional arbitrariness in capital proceedings, 2 9 the Supreme
Court has required states to provide enhanced procedural protec-
tions that ensure heightened decisional reliability and certainty in
capital Cases. 130
This "death is different" principle most plainly commands en-
hanced constitutional protections at the capital trial and sentencing
proceeding.3 ' This principle, however, retains vitality until the mo-
ment of execution.' 3 2 In short, because "execution is the most irre-
128. The prisoner interest in a capital post-conviction proceeding is of far greater
magnitude than the prisoner interests in civil rights cases that Bounds protects. See, e.g.,
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1979) (qualified right of prisoner to send
and receive uncensored mail vindicated in civil rights action).
The prisoner interest in a capital post-conviction proceeding also is more significant
than the interests in federal habeas corpus proceedings Bounds protects because life is at
stake in the capital post-conviction proceeding (and was not an interest before the
Court, or discussed by the Bounds Court).
129. Arbitrariness in its imposition led the Furman Court to invalidate the death pen-
alty under then-existent sentencing procedures in 1972. In the memorable words of
Justice Stewart, "(tihese death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, j.,
concurring). See infra text accompanying notes 159-168..
130. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2710 (1988) (O'ConnorJ., concur-
ring) ("The court has ... imposed a series of unique substantive and procedural restric-
tions designed to ensure that capital punishment is not imposed without the serious and
calm reflection that ought to precede any decision of such gravity and finality."). See also
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601 (1978) (plurality opinion); Woodson V. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976) (plurality opinion).
131. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2710 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Turner v. Murray, 476
U.S. 28, 35 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("The risk of racial prejudice infecting a capital
sentencing proceeding is especially serious in light of the complete finality of the death
sentence."); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) ("[T]he qualitative differ-
ence of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of
scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination." (footnote omitted)). In Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court stated:
From the point of view of the defendant, [the death penalty] is different in both
its severity and its finality. From the point of view of society, the action of the
sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from
any other legitimate state action. It is of vital importance to the defendant and
to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and ap-
pear to be, based on reason rather than caprice and emotion.
Id. at 357-58 (plurality opinion).
132. In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (plurality opinion), the Court stated
that because mentally incompetent prisoners may not be executed, prisoners who may
be incompetent have a due process right to a hearing to assess and determine compe-
tency. Id. at 417-18 (plurality opinion). Ford had exhausted all of his state and federal
post-conviction remedies without obtaining relief when he filed a "successor" habeas
corpus petition asserting that he was incompetent to be executed. Id. at 420 n.I (Powell,
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mediable and unfathomable of penalties,"' 3 3 the private interest in
the accuracy of a proceeding in which life is an issue is "almost
uniquely compelling."
34
B. The Risk of Error From Pro Se Representation
1. The Required Investigation and Preparation of Capital Post-convic-
tion Cases.-Evidence outside the record of the capital proceeding
often is relevant in evaluating and establishing, inter alia, ineffective
assistance of counsel,'" Brady violations, 3 ' prosecutorial miscon-
duct,' 3 7 and other capital post-conviction claims; therefore, prepara-
tion of a post-conviction petition requires a substantial, fresh
inquiry. Experienced attorneys who have volunteered to represent
capital post-conviction petitioners, and who are supported with the
full complement of resources that the biggest law firms in this coun-
try routinely provide, consistently express the most profound pro-
fessional dismay at the complexity and demands of capital post-
conviction legal work. The Brief of the American Bar Association,
participating as amicus curiae in Murray v. Giarratano,' s summarizes
"several comprehensive surveys of attorneys who have represented
death row prisoners in state post-conviction (and federal habeas
corpus) proceedings."'' 39  One survey indicated that the median
time spent by volunteer attorneys on state post-conviction cases was
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In the Court's plurality opinion,
justice Marshall stated that the "heightened concern for fairness and accuracy that has
characterized our review of the process requisite to the taking of a human life" is not
abandoned until "the final fact antecedent to execution has been found." Id. at 414.
By comparison, a capital post-conviction proceedingis a much more integral part of
the capital adjudication process. It is the on/y means to enforce some rights that are
essential components of a constitutional capital trial. See supra text accompanying notes
116-126. If the proceeding is successful, a death penalty is reversed, not postponed
until competency is restored. Cf Ford, 477 U.S. at 425 (PowellJ., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("[The only question raised is not whether, but when, his
execution may take place. This question is important, but it is not comparable to the
antecedent question whether petitioner should be executed at all." (emphasis in origi-
nal; footnote omitted)).
For these reasons, capital post-conviction petitioners have at least as strong a claim
to the heightened protection of the "death is qualitatively different" principle as those
who assert incompetence to be executed.
133. Ford, 477 U.S. at 411-12 (plurality opinion).
134. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 (1985).
135. See cases cited supra notes 110-111.
136. See cases cited supra note 109.
137. See cases cited supra note 108.
138. 109 S. Ct. 303 (1988).
139. Brief of the American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at
29. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 303 (1988) (No. 88-41 I).
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One attorney expressed the sentiments of many who were
polled:
Post-conviction cases can have a devastating effect on an
attorney both financially and emotionally. It consumes
overwhelming amounts of time, energy and work .... For
example, preparing the Motion for Appropriate Relief in
state trial court took two full weeks of my time, that is,
working all day, evenings, and weekends for two weeks on
one case. The reason it takes such a lot of time is that
you're scared to death that if you leave out an issue which a
federal court in another district may decide favorably on
the hext'day, you waived the issue forever.' 4" 2
What is particularly troubling about the idea of forced pro se
representation is that courts in many capital post-conviction cases
(in which the petitioner had post-conviction counsel) have found
trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and produce com-
pelling evidence of mental illness or retardation. 43 Such evidence
is uniquely relevant in a capital sentencing proceeding.' 44 Assum-
140. Id. This included work on the trial, state supreme court, and certiorari phases of
a post-conviction case. Id. at 30. The source of this information is A.B.A. Sec. on Indi-
vidual Rights & Responsibilities, Post-Conviction Death Penalty Representation Project,
Time and Expense Analysis in Post-Conviction Death Penalty Cases (Feb. 1987).
14 1. Brief of the American Bar Ass'n at 31, Giarratano.
142. Id. at 35. Another experienced attorney said: "No case I have ever handled com-
pares in complexity with my Florida death penalty case .... [T]here is nothing more
difficult, more time-consuming, more expensive, and more emotionally exhausting than
handling a death penalty case after conviction." Id. Many others agreed. "Death pen-
alty litigation is unique in 'every aspect' of the case: research, investigation, time, length
of pleadings, etc."; "[this was] the most difficult and time-consuming case that I have
handled in over 20 years of practice." Id. at 31-33. See Mello, Facing Death Alone: The
Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 513, 554-63 (1988) (docu-
menting time and expenses for volunteer, pro bono, and public defender attorneys in
capital post-conviction litigation nationwide).
143. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 110-112.
144. Evidence of a mental disability can bear on several statutory mitigating circum-
stances, see, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. State, 490 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. 1986) (evidence of mental
disorders relevant to three statutory mitigating circumstances), as well as non-statutory
mitigating circumstances, see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1977). (For discussion of
Lockett, see infra text accompanying notes 169-171.) Fully developed, evidence of a
mental disability can support a state supreme court's finding that the death penalty is
disproportionate and may not be imposed. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, 527 So. 2d at 811-12
(evidence in second sentencing hearing of defendant's extreme emotional disturbance
outweighed aggravating circumstances, rendering death sentence inappropriate). It can
help to convince a capital sentencer that the defendant did not have the "reckless indif-
ference to human life," see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987), that along with
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ing, arguendo, that any death-sentenced prisoner has pro se capacity, it
is the capital post-conviction petitioners, who have the strongest
claims that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to
produce evidence of mental illness, who will be least equipped to as-
sert them pro se. A post-conviction court will not be able to discern
from the then-existing record of the capital proceeding the critical
nonrecord evidence of mental illness or retardation (nor any other
nonrecord evidence of constitutional violations). Plainly, a court
cannot make the necessary inquiry to unearth such evidence, at least
without radically altering its constitutionally imposed role of neu-
trality. Even if it could, "the most dedicated trial judges are bound
to overlook meritorious cases without the benefit of an adversary
presentation." 45
2. The Complexity of Capital Post-conviction Law.-To investigate
and plead post-conviction claims, a capital post-conviction peti-
tioner must understand some of the most complicated, dynamic,
and at times inconsistent bodies of law that exist.
There are at least three dimensions to this death penalty law:
(1) the legal principles that govern the capital trial and sentencing
proceeding; (2) the legal principles that measure whether trial coun-
sel provided the constitutionally required effective assistance of
counsel; and (3) the legal principles that govern stays of execution,
waiver, and procedural default, and thus determine whether, and at
what pace, petitioners will be able to litigate post-conviction claims.
a. Substantive Death Penalty Law.-Pro se death-sentenced pris-
oners are not capable of obtaining from law books even the first
dimension of requisite knowledge of the applicable substantive law.
Such law includes the texts and judicial interpretations of state and
federal constitutions, statutes, and rules. The principles that a
death-sentenced prisoner must extract from these disparate sources
and plead in a post-conviction petition interact and assert domi-
nance in the dynamic legal environment of federalism.' 46
These principles are relatively new and usually are stated in the
.'major participation" makes one who did not kill or intend to kill constitutionally eligi-
ble for the death penalty. Id. In its most aggravated form, mental incompetency alone
can halt a scheduled execution. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408-10 (1986).
145. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 826 (1977).
146. See infra note 154 (summaries of the 10 death penalty cases decided by the
Supreme Court last term).
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most general terms.' 4 7 They lack the clarity that comes over time
with legislative amendment and refined judicial interpretation.
Moreover, this collection of substantive legal principles is unique.
Although judges can call upon related constitutional, criminal law,
criminal procedure, and evidence principles to help resolve issues in
death penalty cases,"' it is idiosyncratic death penalty principles,
sometimes alone and sometimes in hybrid forms, that control. The
extent to which principles from other legal fields should be bor-
rowed to help resolve issues in capital adjudication itself is a difficult
issue.' 49 For example, unique death penalty principles govern the
selection of a jury,' 50 the admissibility of evidence,' 5 ' the substance
of minimally permissible argument,' and the sharing of sentencing
responsibility between judge and jury 53 in capital proceedings,
among other aspects of death penalty litigation.
These characteristics of substantive death penalty law make it
uniquely dynamic as well as complex. 54 It also is inherently incon-
147. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 155-194. (analysis of cases that produce
tension between "limited discretion" and "particularized consideration" principles).
148. See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1987) (constitutional test of
culpability that makes a capital defendant who did not kill or intend to kill eligible to die
is whether defendant had major participation in crime and "reckless indifference to
human life"); Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 155-56 (1986) (double jeopardy does not
bar second capital sentencing when, on appeal from first sentencing, court finds evi-
dence does not support sole aggravating circumstance); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
884 (1983) (one aggravating circumstance found by capital sentencer was later held un-
constitutional, see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), but did not require re-
versal of death penalty); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 444-46 (1981) (imposition
of death sentence at second capital trial of defendant sentenced to life imprisonment at
first trial held barred by double jeopardy clause); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97
(1979) (Georgia hearsay rule unconstitutional insofar as it limited scope of mitigating
evidence that Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), allows jury to consider).
149. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 148.
150. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 410,412 (1985) (relevant inquiry in excludingjuror
for cause is whether juror's views on capital punishment would "prevent or substantially
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and
his oath" (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980))); Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 521-23 (1968) (jury from which persons with general or religious objec-
tions to the death penalty were excluded not considered impartial arbiter).
151. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2536 (1987) (introduction of "victim impact
statements" at sentencing proceeding of capital trial violates eighth amendment).
152. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (test for impropriety of prose-
cution's closing argument is whether comments " 'so infected the trial with unfairness as
to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process' " (quoting Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,643 (1974))); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 338-40
(1984) (Donnelly does not render all prosecutorial remarks immune from federal due
process challenge).
153. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464-65 (1984) (no constitutional requirement
that death sentence be imposed by jury rather than judge).
154. For example, in the last term alone, the Court decided 10 death penalty cases. In
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sistent. An illustrative example is the unresolved tension between
most of these cases, the Court addressed new questions or gave new content to issues it
had visited before. For example, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988), a
plurality of the Court held that states may not constitutionally execute those capital de-
fendants who were younger than 16 at the time of the crime. Id. at 2700. Justice
O'Connor concurred in the judgment in a narrower opinion that she based on both the
"result" allowed by the interplay of the two relevant Oklahoma statutes-the execution
of 15-year-old defendants-which she said was of "dubious constitutionality," and the
fact that those statutes lacked "the earmarks of careful consideration" the Court has
"required for other kinds of decisions leading to the death penalty." Id. at 2711,
In Mills v. Maryland, 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988), the Court in a 5-4 decision held uncon-
stitutional a capital sentencing scheme that did not sufficiently inform a sentencing jury
that it could find evidence to be mitigating and weigh it against aggravating evidence
even if the 12 jurors could not unanimously agree that the same aspect of the offense, or
of the offender's record or character, was mitigating. Id. at 1870.
In Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2273 (1988), the Court in another 5-4 decision held
that the State did not abridge Ross's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to an im-
partial jury in a capital case when defense counsel was required to use one of nine avail-
able peremptory challenges to strike a death-prone juror whom the trial judge should
have disqualified for cause pursuant to Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 410 (1985). 108 S. Ct. at 2278. The four dissenting Jus-
tices complained that the trial judge had "arbitrarily take[n] away one of the defendant's
peremptory challenges," id. at 2280, thus unconstitutionally affecting the composition of
the jury panel in violation of Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987). (In Gray, decided
one year earlier, the Court in a plurality opinion held that the improper exclusion of a
single juror who was not irrevocably committed to the death penalty denied that capital
defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury and could not be harmless error.
481 U.S. at 668.)
In Lowenfield v. Phelps, 108 S. Ct. 546 (1988), the Court held that Lowenfield's
death penalty was not unconstitutional merely because the single aggravating circum-
stance that the sentencing jury found was identical to an element of the capital crime.
Id. at 553. The Court found that Louisiana properly narrowed the class of death-eligible
defendants by limiting those who could be found guilty of capital murder. Id. at 555.
Three dissenting Justices argued, inter alia, that by relegating the "narrowing" function
to the guilt phase, Louisiana had vested the sentencing jury with unconstitutionally un-
restricted discretion at the sentencing phase. Id. at 561. See iq/ra text accompanying
notes 155-194.
In Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct. 2320 (1988), a plurality of the Court discussed,
without deciding, whether there may be a quantum of doubt-"residual doubt"--that is
not extinguished by a capital conviction and thus is potentially mitigating in the sentenc-
ing phase. Id. at 2326-27. The plurality was disinclined to recognize such doubt as a
constitutionally compelled mitigating circumstance. Justices O'Connor and Blackmun,
who concurred in the judgment, concluded that "[olur cases do not support the propo-
sition that a defendant who has been found to be guilty of a capital crime beyond a
reasonable doubt has a constitutional right to reconsideration by the sentencing body of
lingering doubts about his guilt." Id. at 2334.
See also Johnson v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 1981, 1986 (1988) (holding unconstitu-
tional the use of a prior invalid felony conviction to establish an aggravating circum-
stance); Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 1859 (1988) (holding
unconstitutionally vague an "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating cir-
cumstance that the state court had not limited through interpretation); Satterwhite v.
Texas, 108 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1988) (holding that admission at a capital sentencing
proceeding of psychiatrist's testimony based in part on an examination he conducted of
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the root principles of "limited discretion" and "particularized
consideration."
The death penalty is constitutional because the discretion of
capital sentencers is limited' 55 and, conversely, because capital
sentencers may give particularized consideration to the broadest ar-
ray of mitigating evidence, including non-statutory factors.' 56 The
"tension"' 57 between these two principles has forced the Court
"from pillar to post, with the result that the sort of reasonable pre-
dictability upon which legislatures, trial courts, and appellate courts
must of necessity rely has been all but completely sacrificed."' 58
The seeds of still unresolved disagreement about the interplay
of these two principles were sown in the nine separate opinions,
consuming 233 pages, in Furman v. Georgia.t59 In Furman the Court
held unconstitutional the "system of capital punishment then in
a capital defendant without complying with the Miranda-based rule announced in Estelle
v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), could not be presumed harmless constitutional error);
Amadeo v. Zant, 108 S. Ct. 1771, 1778 (1988) (holding petitioner established requisite
'.cause" for failing to raise in the state trial court a constitutional challenge to the com-
position of his grand jury, trial jury, and sentencing jury when he established that his
trial lawyers would have mounted such a challenge if they had known about a previously
undisclosed memorandum from the district attorney to the jury commissioner that di-
rected commissioner to intentionally discriminate against blacks and women in compil-
ing master jury list); Yates v. Aiken, 108 S. Ct. 534, 538 (1988) (holding retroactive the
decision in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1979), which held unconstitutional an in-
struction that shifted to defendant the burden of proving element of a crime).
In sum, inone term Thompson,Johnson, Louenfield and Mills applied eighth and four-
teenth amendment principles to establish important new death penalty rules; Ross, }'ares,
Satterwhite, Amadeo and Maynard clarified prior death penalty and habeas corpus decisions
in important respects; dicta in Franklin suggests a possible issue for future litigation.
155. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-89 (1976) (plurality opinion) (construing
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
156. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion).
157. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct. 2320, 2331 (1988).
158. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 629 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Chief Justice Burger later observed that "the variety of
opinions supporting the judgment in Furman engendered confusion as to what was re-
quired in order to impose the death penalty in accordance with the Eighth Amend-
ment." Lockett, 438 U.S.-at 599. Some states distilled from Furman the requirement that
their death penalty statutes eliminate discrimination entirely. These states enacted
mandatory death penalty statutes that required capital sentencers to impose the death
penalty upon convictions of listed capital crimes. Mandatory sentencing schemes were
struck down in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion), and
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion). Other legislatures read
Furman to require only that their death penalty statutes limit the discretion of capital
sentencers, not that the statutes remove the capital sentencing decision entirely from
them. "Limited discretion" sentencing schemes were upheld by plurality opinions in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). and
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). See infra text accompanying notes 162-167.
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existence in this country ' 60 because it allowed capital sentencers
unlimited discretion to decide when the death penalty was
appropriate.' 6 .
Four years after Furman, the Court upheld the capital sentenc-
ing statutes of Georgia,' 62 Florida,' 63 and Texas.' The Court
found that the death penalty statutes in these states adequately lim-
ited the discretion of capital sentencers. At the same time, the
Court held unconstitutional the mandatory death penalty statutes of
North Carolina' 6 5 and Louisiana.' 66 The Court held that these
mandatory death penalty statutes were unconstitutional, inter alia,
because they failed to allow the capital sentencer to give more ex-
pansive "particularized consideration" to "the character and record
of each convicted defendant" before deciding whether to sentence
that defendant to death.'
6 7
In the intervening twelve years, the Court has labored to fur-
ther define the "limited discretion" principle and reconcile it with
the "particularized consideration" principle. 68 The inability to rec-
oncile the near irreconcilable is more than a subtle undercurrent in
the Court's jurisprudence. One of these principles has survived
160. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 907 (1983) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (discussing
Furnan).
161. Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 874 ("A fair
statement of the consensus expressed by the Court in Furman is that 'where discretion is
afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a
human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and lim-
ited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.' " (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1986) (plurality opinion))). The dissentingJus-
tices in Furman contended that the consensus in Fur man itself was an abrupt change in
the law that reversed the Court's then relatively recent decision in McGautha v. Califor-
nia, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), which had validated the exercise of discretion by capital
sentencers. See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 387-88 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
162. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
163. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
164. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
165. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
166. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
167. lI odon, 428 U.S. at 303.
168. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), Chief Justice Burger retrospectively
identified the divisions on the 1976 Court that would make reconciliation difficult:
Four years after Furman, we considered Eighth Amendment issues posed by five
of the post-Furman death penalty statutes. Four Justices took the position that
all five statutes complied with the Constitution; two Justices took the position
that none of them complied. Hence, the disposition of each case varied accord-
ing to the votes of three Justices who delivered a joint opinion in each of the
five cases upholding the constitutionality of the statutes of Georgia, Florida and
Texas, and holding those of North Carolina and Louisiana unconstitutional.
Id. at 600-01 (footnote omitted).
19 891
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conflict with the other to become the basis of decision in many
cases.
In Lockett v. Ohio,' 69 for example, the Court applied the "partic-
ularized consideration" principle to reverse a death penalty. The
Ohio statute precluded the capital sentencer from considering, "as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
any circumstances of the offense .... ""'0 The Court held that the
discretion of the capital sentencer had been improperly limited to
consideration of evidence relevant only to statutory mitigating
circumstances. 17
1
Five years later, in Zant v. Stephens 172 the Court cited the "par-
ticularized consideration" principle not as an expansive grant of dis-
cretion, but as one of only two limits on the power of a capital
sentencer to "select" a capital defendant for execution.' '7 In Zant
the Court acknowledged that in Georgia "the finding of an aggravat-
ing circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing
body in the exercise of its discretion, apart from its function of nar-
rowing the class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for
the death penalty."' 74 This, however, did not render the statute
unconstitutional.
The Court concluded that there are two phases in Georgia's
death penalty process: a "definition" phase and a "selection"
phase.' 75 When the capital sentencer finds an aggravating circum-
stance, it "defines" the capital defendant as death eligible. The
need to find at least one statutory aggravating circumstance thus
limits the sentencer's discretion to place capital defendants in the
death-eligible pool. ' 76 The aggravating circumstances, however, do
not and need not limit the "selection" for execution of any con-
victed defendant in the death-sentenced pool, as long as the capital
sentencer makes its decision as the result of "an individualized de-
termination" based on "the character of the individual and the cir-
cumstances of the crime," and as long as that determination is
169. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
170. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original).
171. Id. justice White, in dissent, stated that "the Court has now completed its about-
face since Furman" because "the sentencer may constitutionally impose the death pen-
alty only as an exercise of his unguided discretion after being presented with all circum-
stances which the defendant might believe to be conceivably relevant . Id. at 622
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
173. Id. at 878-80.
174. Id. at 874.
175. Id. at 875.
176. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877-78 (1983).
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subject to appellate review.' 77
In 1986 the Court underscored the discretion-enhancing com-
ponent of the "particularized consideration" value in Skipper v. South
Carolina,'7 ' holding that a capital defendant was constitutionally en-
titled to place before a capital sentencer evidence of his or her good
behavior in prison subsequent to the crime.' 79
Last term, however, in Franklin v. Lynaugh 8 0 the Court upheld
the refusal of a Texas sentencing court to instruct the sentencing
jury that they could consider, and give independent mitigating
weight to, the defendant's unblemished behavior during seven years
of incarceration without limiting their consideration of that evidence
to a single "special issue": the future dangerousness of the defend-
ant.'' A plurality of the Court held that so limiting the jury's con-
sideration of the evidence did not unconstitutionally deny Franklin
his right to have the sentencing jury consider and weigh "any
relevant mitigating evidence."' 8 2 The plurality said the Court had
never answered the question: "relevant to what?"' 8 3 Under these
circumstances, relevance could be limited to predicting
dangerousness.
The Franklin plurality acknowledged, in understated terms, the
source of disagreement in many cases: "Arguably [the 'particular-
ized consideration' and 'limited discretion' lines of cases] are some-
177. Id. at 879-80. Justices Marshall and Brennan now complained about the limitless
"particularized consideration" power, arguing that after the "threshold finding" that a
convicted defendant is death eligible, the jurors are "left completely at large with noth-
ing to guide them but their whims and prejudices." Id. at 910 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting). The dissenters concluded that Georgia's sentencing scheme therefore au-
thorizes the same "standardless jury discretion" that was condemned as unconstitu-
tional in Furman and Gregg. Justice Marshall said:
Today we learn for the first time that the Court did not mean what it said in
Gregg v. Georgia. We now learn that the actual decision whether the defend-
ant lives or dies may still be left to the unfettered discretion of the jury.
Although we were assured in Gregg that sentencing discretion was "to be exer-
cised . . . by clear and objective standards" . . . we are now told that the State
need do nothing whatsoever to guide the jury's ultimate decision whether to
sentence a defendant to death or spare his life.
Id. (citation omitted).
178. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
179. Id. at 49.
180. 108 S. Ct. 2320 (1988) (plurality opinion).
181. Id. at 2324 n.3. Under Texas law, that special issue and one unrelated to the
"good behavior in prison" mitigating evidence-whether "the murder was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that death would result"-were the
only questions the Franklin sentencing jury was asked to answer. Because the jury an-
swered both questions in the affirmative, the death penalty was imposed. Id. at 2325.
182. Id. at 2330.
183. Id.
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what in 'tension' with each other."'' 84
The complexity produced by this basic jurisprudential conflict
is aggregated by other considerations. For example, the rules de-
rived from this principle, and other conflicting principles,18 5 often
are announced in plurality opinions, 8 6 which means that in order to
discern the rules they announce, a capital post-conviction petitioner
must be able to identify the "holding of the Court ... as that posi-
tion taken by those members who concurred in the judgments on
184. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct. 2320, 2331 (1988) (citing California v. Brown,
479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Justice Stevens argued that the
"plurality turns its decision in Skipper on end"; evidence of "past conduct often provides
insight into a person's character that will evoke a merciful response ... even though it
may shed no light on what may happen in the future." Id. at 2336 (Stevens,J., dissent-
ing). Justice Stevens did not deny the "tension" identified by the plurality but criticized
the plurality for resolving that tension by "blinding" the jury "co relevant evidence" in
order to limit its discretion. Id. at 2340.. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Blackmun,
concurred in the judgment because, in her view, the mitigating evidence was relevant to
the future dangerousness "special issue" and therefore the jury was able to consider and
give effect to it. Id. at 2333-34. She left undecided, for another case, whether a "jury's
inability to give effect" to mitigating evidence that is not relevant to a special issue
would amount "to an Eighth Amendment violation." Id. at 2333 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
185. Another example of conflict is the unresolved debate about the degree of en-
hanced reliability that is constitutionally necessary to support imposition of the death
penalty. In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1984), a prosecutor in a death penalty
case argued in his closing remarks to the sentencing jury that their decision was not
final, but was subject to review by the courts. The Court held that those remarks might
have reduced the sense of "awesome responsibility" a sentencing jury must accept in a
capital case. Id. at 329-30 (quoting McGautha v. California,402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971)).
It is this sense of responsibility, in part, that limits discretion and assures enhanced relia-
bility in death penalty proceedings. In his dissenting opinionJustice Rehnquist warned
that the Court should avoid turning "perceived departure from what it conceived to be
optimum procedure in a capital case into a ground for constitutional reversal." Id. at
351.
This debate was revisited in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986). In Darden
the prosecutor gave an inflammatory closing argument in which he referred to the de-
fendant as an "animal" who should not have been let out of his prison cell (on a week-
end furlough prior to the capital crime) "except on a leash" with a "prison guard at the
other end of that leash." Id. at 180 n.12. In response to the Court's conclusion that
these comments did not erode the reliability of Darden's death penalty, Justice Black-
mun, dissenting, said:
[Tihis Court has stressed repeatedly in the decade since Gregg .. . that the
Eighth Amendment requires a heightened degree of reliability in any case
where a State seeks to take the defendant's life. Today's opinion, however,
reveals a Court willing to tolerate not only imperfection but a level of fairness
and reliability so low it should make conscientious prosecutors cringe.
Id. at 188-89 (footnote and citations omitted).
186. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988), Franklin v. Lynaugh,
108 S. Ct. 2320 (1988); Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2273 (1988); Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68 (1985); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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the narrowest grounds,' 87 because "no single rationale supporting
the result commands a majority of the court. '18
In addition, to plead ineffective assistance of counsel claims, pe-
titioners must not only be able to extrapolate from- confusing opin-
ions how substantive law properly applies to their particular cases;
petitioners also must be able credibly to explain how and when their
lawyers who failed to raise such claims ought to have reasonably
been able to foresee the ostensibly favorable development of the
law.
For all of these reasons, substantive death penalty law which
often is too elusive to support "predictability" by "legislatures, trial
courts, and appellate courts,"' 89 is beyond the intellectual reach of
even the most sophisticated death row inmate.
b. Law Governing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.-Assuming, ar-
guendo, that a capital post-conviction petitioner is able to understand
these substantive principles, the petitioner must learn the second
dimension of death penalty law: the different set of legal principles
that determine whether capital trial counsel's failure to assert one or
more of these principles "fell below an objective standard of reason-
ableness,"' 9 0 and if so, whether "there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different."' 9 '
The petitioner's attempt at self-education begins in the face of
the Supreme Court's observation that "collateral review will fre-
quently be the only means through which an accused can effectuate
the right to counsel" because "[a] layman will ordinarily be unable
to recognize counsel's errors and to evaluate counsel's perform-
ance; consequently a criminal defendant will rarely know that he has
not been represented competently until after trial or appeal, usually
when he consults another lawyer about his case."' 9 2
In order to appreciate how his or her lawyer might have been
constitutionally ineffective, a capital post-conviction petitioner must
understand the normative standard of defense in a capital trial. In
the sixth amendment cases that have established the right to counsel
187. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
188. Franklin, 108 S. Ct. at 2336 n.i.
189. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 629 (1977) (RehnquistJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
190. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
191. id. at 694.
192. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986).
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at trial (even in a misdemeanor prosecution in which a defendant
faces as little as a day in jail),' the Supreme Court found that a
criminal defendant does not possess such knowledge and, thus, "re-
quires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceeding
against him.""'
c. Procedural Death Penalty Law.-The third complex dimension
of death penalty law, which itself has at least two components, is
procedural. The first level of procedural complexity is produced
when state officials set execution dates for capital defendants who
have not yet filed, or have not completed, post-conviction litiga-
tion.1 9 5 Frequently, a petitioner then must simultaneously litigate a
capital post-conviction case in a federal and state forum, often
before more than one court in each, in order to stay the execu-
tion. 96 This sometimes involves a literal race from court to court to
meet deadlines. A state post-conviction case can move, in this man-
ner, from state trial court, through the highest state court, and (then
as a federal habeas corpus case) through the federal district court
and circuit court and United States Supreme Court in a matter of
days. 197
This "photo-finish" appellate review' 9 8 was sanctioned to a sig-
nificant degree by the Supreme Court in Barefoot v. Estelle.'99 In
Barefoot the Court announced several "guidelines" that govern the
pace at which collateral capital litigation may proceed.20 0 Although
these guidelines govern the pace offederal habeas corpus litigation,
they have their counterparts in state practices and procedures that
193. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
194. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1933).
195. See Mello, supra note 142, at 546-48.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 548 (citing 3D CIR. R. 29(3)(b); 5TH CIR. R. 8).
198. Special Project.: Capital Punishment in 1984. Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and Con-
sisteney, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1208 (1984).
199. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
200. Id. at 892-96. The first guideline is that "[t]he primary means of separating meri-
torious from frivolous appeals should be the decision to grant or withhold a certificate of
probable cause." Id. at 892-93. Second, "[wihen a certificate of probable cause is issued
... petitioner must then be afforded an opportunity to address the merits, and the court
of appeals is obligated to decide the merits of the appeal." Id. at 893. This necessitates
a stay of execution. Id. at 893-94. Third, the circuit courts may adopt local rules author-
izing expedited procedures for habeas corpus appeals. Id. at 894. The fourth guideline
suggests a different standard for second and "successive" petitions. "The granting of a
stay should reflect the presence of substantial grounds upon which relief might be
granted." Id. at 895. Finally, "[s]tays of execution are not automatic pending the filing
and consideration of a petition for a writ of certiorari from this Court to the court of
appeals that has denied a writ of habeas corpus." Id.
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govern the pace of state capital post-conviction proceedings. 20
The most troublesome guideline, in the view of the dissenting
justices, was the third one, which authorized federal circuit courts to
"adopt expedited procedures in resolving the merits of [capital]
habeas appeals, notwithstanding the issuance of a certificate of
probable cause. "202 The Court added that pursuant to expedited
procedures, the "merits of an appeal may be decided upon the mo-
tion for a stay."12 0 3 That is, courts can require capital post-convic-
tion petitioners to litigate whether an imminent execution should be
stayed along with all the substantive and procedural issues that con-
stitute the normally complex merits of a federal habeas corpus ap-
peal." °4 Even though the district court may have granted a
certificate of probable cause, which requires a "substantial showing
of the denial of [a] federal right,12 0 5 the circuit court can summarily
resolve the case after argument and even dismiss it as frivolous.20 6
Approval of expedition was premised, in part, on the "secon-
dary" role the Court accorded capital federal habeas corpus:
The role of federal habeas proceedings, while important in
assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is secon-
dary and limited. Federal courts are not forums in which to
relitigate state trials. Even less is federal habeas a means
by which a defendant is entitled to delay an execution in-
definitely. The procedures adopted to facilitate the orderly
consideration and disposition of habeas petitions are not
legal entitlements that a defendant has a right to pursue
irrespective of the contribution these procedures make to-
ward uncovering constitutional error.2 0 7
The Court's concern with the important goal of finality in capi-
tal cases is understandable. Barefoot, however, does authorize an ad-
judication pace in capital habeas corpus cases that, at least
sometimes, makes exceedingly difficult "any fine-tuned inquiry into
201. See Mello, supra note 142, at 569-85.
202. 463 U.S. at 894. See id. at 906 (Marshall and Brennan. jJ., dissenting).
203. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 884 (1983).
204. Id. at 894-95.
205. Stewart v. Beto, 454 F.2d 268, 270 n.2 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 925
(1972), quoted with approval in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983).
206. 463 U.S. at 894.
207. Id. at 887-88. The Court then quoted Lambert v. Barrett, 159 U.S. 660, 662
(1895): "It is natural that counsel for the condemned in a capital case should lay hold of
every ground which, in their judgment, might tend to the advantage of their client, but




the actual merits."2 0 8 That capital post-conviction litigation may
proceed at this accelerated pace enhances the risk of error attendant
to pro se representation and, correspondingly, makes the early provi-
sion of counsel to death-sentenced prisoners in state post-convic-
tion proceedings essential.
It is not only the short time frames and unnerving quality of
stay litigation in capital post-conviction proceedings that make it
procedurally complex; in order to draft his or her petition, the peti-
tioner also must understand the complicated rules governing waiver
and procedural'default to determine which issues trial counsel pre-
served and which were waived. 20 9 No evaluation of a potential inef-
fectiveness claim, or virtually any other capital post-conviction
claim, can proceed without this knowledge.2 t °
Capital fair trial rights that are "inherently personal [and] fun-
damental ... can be waived only by the [capital] defendant and not
by his attorney. "211 This is, however, a very limited category of pre-
ferred rights.21 2 All other capital fair trial rights can be waived
through inaction by counsel, before trial, during trial, or on ap-
peal. 21 3 To draft a capital post-conviction petition, the death-sen-
tenced prisoner must be able to (1) understand the unique
substantive principles that define the rights a defendant has in a cap-
ital trial and sentencing proceeding; (2) identify those fair trial
rights that were asserted (and therefore preserved) and those that
were not asserted; (3) in the latter respect, determine if counsel has
a legitimate excuse for failing to assert these rights that allows the
petitioner to assert them;2 14 (4) determine, alternatively, whether
counsel's failure to assert those rights was unreasonable; 21 5 and (5)
determine, after careful assessment of all the evidence and alleged
errors in the case, whether counsel's unreasonable performance
prejudiced the case, rendering the assistance of counsel constitu-
208. Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487, 492 (Phillips, Cir. J., 4th Cir. 1980).
209. See generally D. WILKES, JR., supra note 9; Robson & Mello, Ariadne's Pr'ovisions: A
"Clue of Thread" to the Intricacies of Procedural Default, Adequate and Independent State Grounds,
and Florida 's Death Penalty, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 89 (1988).
210. See generally D. WILKES. JR., supra note 9.
211. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also
Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 1973).
212. "These rights include (I) the right to plead guilty, (2) the right to trial by jury,
and (3) the right to testify personally." D. WILKES, JR., supra note 9, § 8-24, at 200.
213. Id.
214. One such excuse might be whether the right, at the time it might have been
asserted, was a novel constitutional right. Id. at 200.
215. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-91 (1984).
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tionally ineffective.2 6
If the pro se petitioner fails to properly identify and clearly raise
a fair trial claim that can be raised in a capital post-conviction pro-
ceeding, he or she presumptively waives it. 17 That claim cannot be
asserted in a federal habeas corpus petition unless there is "cause"
for having failed to assert it in the state post-conviction proceeding
and waiver of the issue would result in "prejudice. 2 1 1 An assertion
that death-sentenced prisoners have the capacity to understand
these complex procedural rules and apply them, often expedi-
tiously, to the equally complex substantive law governing death pen-
alty cases is virtually self-refuting.
3. Learning the Law And Preparing a Capital Post-conviction Case
While Awaiting Death.-To be effective pro se litigants, death-sen-
tenced prisoners would have to teach themselves the three dimen-
sions of death penalty law and investigate and prepare their cases as
they await death or more actively prepare to die. There is little
doubt that the consciousness of impending death can be immobiliz-
ing. In Furman v. Georgia219 Justice Brennan said:
[W]e know that mental pain is an inseparable part of our
practice of punishing criminals by death, for the prospect
of pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the inev-
itable long wait between the imposition of sentence and the
actual infliction of death .... As the California Supreme
Court pointed out, "the process of carrying out a verdict of
death is often so degrading and brutalizing to the human
spirit as to constitute psychological torture.-
220
This opinion has been widely shared and expressed by other jus-
2212223tices, prison wardens,222 psychiatrists and psychologists,2  and
216. Id. at 691-96.
217. D. WILKES, JR., supra note 9, § 8-24, at 193-201.
218. Id. at 196-98 (explaining Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)).
219. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
220. Id. at 288-89 (quoting People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 649, 493 P.2d 880,
894, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 166 (1972)).
221. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 382 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (acknowledging that
"a man awaiting execution must inevitably experience extraordinary mental anguish");
Solesbee v. Balcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he onset of
insanity while awaiting execution of a death sentence is not a rare phenomenon.").
222. See, e.g., C. DuFFY, 88 MEN AND 2 WOMEN 254 (1962) ("The men of death row live
in fear and hopelessness, and their thoughts are never off the glass-walled enclosure that
waits for them six floors below. This is not justice but torture .... ).
223. See. e.g., Strafer, Volunteering For Execution: CompetencY. Votlunariness and the Ph'opiety
of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860, 872 (1983) (describing the




Impending death need not produce insanity in death-sentenced
inmates to be a "risk of error" factor. 22 '5 The more limited, relevant
inquiry is whether it significantly impairs death-sentenced prisoners'
capacities as pro se litigants. It is difficult to contend otherwise.226
Indeed, the Court's description in Ford v. Wainwright 221 of the im-
portance to the death-sentenced prisoner, "after conviction," 228 of
the psychiatric "representative" applies with at least equal force to
counsel in capital post-conviction cases: "[W]ithout any adversarial
assistance from the prisoner's representative ... the factfinder loses
the substantial benefit of potentially probative information. The re-
sult is a much greater likelihood of an erroneous decision. "229
C. The State's Disinterest in Denying Counsel
Inherently, enforcement of the access right is in government's in-
terest. Unlike most other constitutional rights that are intended to,
and do, limit governmental sovereignty, the access right asserts gov-
ernmental sovereignty. When implemented, the access right allows
death-sentenced inmates at Mecklenburg Prison in Virginia); Note, The Death Penaly
Cases, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1268, 1342 (1968) ("(l]nsanity... is a common result of con-
finement pending execution" (citing, inter alia, testimony of medical doctor and study
conducted by psychiatrist)); Note, Mental Suffering Under Sentence of Death: A Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 57 IOWA L. REV. 814, 829 (1972) ("The observable result of mental
suffering inflicted on the condemned prisoner is destruction of spirit, undermining of
sanity, and mental trauma . (reviewing psychological and psychiatric studies and
data)).
224. See, e.g., A. CAMus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION AND
DEATH 205 (1966) ("As a general rule, a man is undone waiting for capital punishment
well before he dies.'").
225. Psychologist L. Rainey, however, summarized one "relatively large-scale study of
cancer patients"-a group of cognitively and emotionally normal people-that revealed
that "46 percent of the patients manifested a psychiatric disturbance (according to the
criteria of the Psychiatric Diagnostic and Statistical Manual) and the incidence rate rose con-
siderably in those patients with more advanced disease." Rainey, The Experience of Dying,
in DYING: FACING THE FACTS 137, 149 (2d ed. 1988) (summarizing Derogatis, The Preva-
lence of Psychiatric Disorders Among Cancer Patients, 249J. A.M.A. 751 (1983)). Rainey con-
cluded that "a sizable proportion of terminally ill patients, but by no means all patients,
will manifest marked emotional dysphoria, changes in mental status, characterologic
problems, or severe interpersonal conflict." Id. at 150.
It was the imminence of death, not their physiological conditions, that provoked
these emotional and psychological problems in a random sample of normal well-ad-
justed people who were being treated, with the support of family and friends, in three of
the best and most caring hospitals in the country.
226. Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511, 513 (E.D. Va. 1986) (factual finding of
district court).
227. 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (plurality opinion).
228. Id. at 414.
229. Id.
500 [VOL. 48:455
1989] STATE POST-CONVICTION RIGHT To COUNSEL
litigants to enforce the United States Constitution, state constitu-
tions, statutes enacted by Congress and state legislatures, rules
adopted by executives, and the common-law decisions of courts. By
helping vest the jurisdiction of courts over disputes, it animates Ar-
ticle III of the United States Constitution and its state counterparts.
Thus, by enforcing the access right, a state enforces its own law.
The state's obligatory interest in enforcing its law is one of its most
compelling governmental interests; it originated in the birth of le-
gitimate government." s
230. The access right was conceived as a coherent and whole right to legal help in civil
cases that was in the interest of the poor, and insofar as it helped extend the King's law
throughout the realm, in the deep interest of the state as well.
By the 15th century in England and Scotland, the Crown had assured that there
were attorneys available to help at least some of the poor both draft pleadings and litigate
claims in court. Their common and most important legal ancestor was Rome. See 5 R.
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 704 (1959). See generally R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTioUiTY
To MODERN TIMES (1953). In Rome, the poor person's advocate in court was the patri-
cian head (patronus) of the Roman household. Id. at 44-45.
With the disintegration of the Roman Empire, the law of the Church became au-
thoritative. Clerical advocates were the defensores pauperum ("defenders of the poor")
who represented miserabiles personae ("wretched persons"), first in ecclesiastical courts
and later, along with lay advocates, in secular courts. H. COHEN, HISTORY OF THE Ec-
LISH BAR 24-29, 159 (1967). Their "business" was "that of advocates at law to defend
the rights of the poor and the liberties of the Church against all aggressors and invad-
ers." Id. at 24.
With the conversion of England to Christianity, Rome's legal aid tradition pre-
served by the Church gradually became part of England's ecclesiastical court practice.
By the 9th and 10th centuries in England, churchmen were authorized to represent or-
phans and widows in secular courts, as well as the poor generally in ecclesiastical courts.
Id. at 158.
During the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries, the English Crown, recognizing that
"[t]he notion of personal sovereignty carried with it a paternal, or at least a proprietary,
duty to enforce fairness and fight between subject and subject," see Maguire, Povert' and
Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 366 (1923), sponsored numerous reforms intended
to make justice equally available to rich and poor. Maguire summarizes these three cen-
turies, saying: "The humanitarianism of the English kings from 1216 to 1495 is rather
surprising. They did or meant to do much more toward helping their poor subjects
enforce legal claims than many of our states are doing today." Id. at 370.
The culmination of these reforms was the enactment, in 1495, of I I Hen. 7, ch. 12.
The right to counsel granted by the text of the Act was broad. It applied to "every
pouer persone ... [who] ... shall have cause of accion" against "any persone" who may
be "within the realme." It required the appointment of "lerned Councell and at-
torneyes," both to draft and prepare writs and litigate the cases. It governed in "all such
suytes to be made afore the Kingis Justices," "Barons of his Eschequer," "and all other
Justices in Courtes of Recorde." Maguire, supra, at 373.
Remarkably, this statute, in partnership with 23 Hen. 8, ch. 15 (which exempted
indigent litigants from liability for costs), remained the backbone of the English legal aid
system for almost 400 years. Maguire, supro, at 377. See also E. MATTHEWS & A. OULToN,
LEGAL AID AND ADVICE 1-22 (1971).
Similarly, in 15th century Scotland, the then-independent Scottish Parliament pro-
vided that the King shall "ordain" judges to appoint advocates, "persons knowledgeable
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In our constitutional democracy, the access right serves its
highest purpose'when those seeking to invoke the protections that
the law provides are the least popular litigants. This description ap-
plies with full force to death-sentenced prisoners. Because of the
extraordinary private interest at stake in a capital post-conviction
proceeding, the grave risk of erroneous deprivation of life absent
legal assistance, and the state's inherent interest in enforcing the
rule of law, even -a most extraordinary, specifically identified state
interest in withholding counsel could not-justify its denial. No such
countervailing interest exists:
The state has a strong finality interest in enforcing its criminal
judgments, including its capital judgments.23 I But the state's inter-
est in finality presumes a constitutional conviction and sentence. It
therefore has no interest in enforcing those judgments against
death-sentenced prisoners who have been unconstitutionally con-
victed or sentenced to death. To the contrary, "[b]oth society and
affected individuals have a compelling interest in insuring that death
sentences have been constitutionally imposed. 232
in law," to represent the poor in civil cases. C. STODDART, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
LEGAL AID IN SCOTLAND I (1979). The appointment of advocates for those "[poor] crea-
tures" who lacked "cunning" and "expenses," Scot. Parl. Acts 1424, ch. 24, helped dis-
charge the "duty of a king to give special hearing and protection to the weak." AN
INTRODUCTION TO ScoTrTIsH LEGAL HISTORY 330 (1958). King James I had an enlight-
ened "preoccupation with the impartial ministering of justice." Id.
Implementation of the legal aid value was inconsistent and at times arbitrary.
Maguire, supra, at 371-72. It is far more significant that the legal aid value thrived so
long ago and persisted in what were brutal societies by contemporary measures.
In the end, the advocati pauperum vindicated not only the rights of the poor, but also
the rule of law. By discharging their legal aid duty, early governments helped fulfill their
primary law-giving purpose.
231. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,425 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in the judg-
ment and concurring in part). Capital post-conviction claims in state proceedings, unlike
federal habeas corpus claims, have usually not been rejected before by any court. Inso-
far as the state's finality interest is enhanced when a court already has rejected a claim
that a litigant contends should be afforded procedural protections, a post-conviction
petitioner begins with a clean or relatively clean slate. See supra text accompanying notes
116-117. In comparison, when the petitioner files a federal habeas corpus petition, the
fair trial claims of the petitioner have been rejected at least once, and often two or more
times. This is because federal habeas corpus claims have been "exhausted" through the
state system and therefore have been considered by either (I) a trial court and the state's
highest court (on direct appeal); or (2) a post-conviction court and possibly a state ap-
pellate court (on state collateral review). See D. WILKES, JR., supra note 9, §§ 8-15 to -21,
at 177-91 (discussing exhaustion of state remedies requirement for federal habeas
corpus review).
Thus, despite Bounds s well-justified reverence for federal habeas corpus, the state
has a less significant finality interest in denying counsel to state post-conviction
petitioners.
232. Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118, 1122 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc). The
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The Supreme Court has recognized the special governmental
responsibility, which is not fully shared by a private litigant, to tem-
per advocacy with the governmental "interest in the fair and accu-
rate adjudication of criminal cases."'2 " This interest does not end
after direct appeal.23 4
While it might appear initially that implementing a federal ac-
cess right requiring affirmative state action raises problems of feder-
alism, the legitimate federalism-derived interests of the state are
served, rather than retarded, by the provision of counsel to capital
post-conviction petitioners. The recently enacted Federal Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 198835 highlights this state interest. This Act
requires the appointment of counsel to death-sentenced state prison-
ers when they are eligible to file federal habeas corpus petitions. 23 6
Newly appointed counsel will assert all potentially meritorious
claims for habeas relief. As a result, state court adjudication of post-
conviction claims may be affected in a variety of ways.
First, the federal court might strictly construe the pro se state
pleadings and require the petitioner, now represented by counsel,
to further exhaust state remedies, in which case the now-repre-
sented petitioner must go through the state post-conviction process
237again, although the court could waive the exhaustion require-
ment.238 Alternatively, the federal court might hold an evidentiary
Supreme Court in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), said that "[flrom the point
of view of society, the action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens also
differs dramatically from any other legitimate state action. It is ofvital importance to the
defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and
appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion." Id. at 357-58.
233. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985). See also Young v. United States ex rel.
Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987) (prosecutors acting as state officials with
"the power to employ the full machinery of the state ... [must] be guided solely by their
sense of public responsibility for the attainment of justice").
234. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
235. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, reprinted in 44 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3001
(Nov. 2, 1988).
236. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001, 102 Stat. 4393-94 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(q)(4)(B)). The Act also provides, somewhat enigmatically, that "in e'vety criminal
action in which a defendant is charged with a nite which may be punishable by death," an indigent
defendant is entitled to the appointment of counsel whether the need arises before or
afterjudgment. id., 102 Stat. 4393 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(A)) (empha-
sis added). Once counsel is appointed under either section, the attorney must represent
the defendant through every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings. Id., 102
Stat. 4394 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (q)(8)).
237. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520-21 (1982).
238. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982). Whether exhaustion of state remedies prior to en-
tertaining the federal petition is required is viewed as a question of comity and not as a
constitutional prerequisite to the exercise of federal judicial power. See Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 425-26 (1963).
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hearing,239 either because the state court held no evidentiary hear-
ing or because the absence of counsel undermined the accuracy of
the state post-conviction court's factfinding. 240 Or the federal court
might liberally construe the pro se state pleading and resolve the fed-
eral habeas corpus issues on the merits, even though the pro se peti-
tioner had presented them adequately to exhaust them but too
obscurely for the state courts fairly to consider them.24 '
Each of these possibilities undermines a legitimate state interest,
whether that interest is in finality or in the opportunity for plenary
consideration by state courts of important state-federal issues. 242
Appointed counsel during the initial state proceedings would help
assure that capital post-conviction petitioners raise all potentially
meritorious issues, present them clearly for plenary state court con-
sideration, and identify those that merit review by a federal court.
This would ultimately promote finality and efficiency as well as fair-
ness and accuracy.
The realization that early state provision of counsel often oper-
ates to protect state interests motivated twenty-two states to file an
amicus curiae brief supporting expansion of the right to counsel in
Gideon v. Wainwright.24s That same realization today has motivated
nineteen of the thirty-six states which authorize capital punishment
to make appointment of counsel mandatory, either upon request of
an inmate prior to his or her filing a post-conviction petition, or
upon his or her filing in conjunction with an opportunity to amend
the petition thereafter.244 Combined with the new federal mandate
239. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982) gives a presumption of correctness to state post-con-
viction court factfinding unless, inter alia, "the fact finding procedure.., was not ade-
quate to afford a full and fair hearing," the "material facts were not adequately
developed," the state court failed to appoint counsel for an indigent applicant "in depri-
vation of his constitutional right," or "the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and ade-
quate hearing." Id. at (d)(2), (3), (5), (6).
240. Id. at (d)(5).
241. See I J. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 49 (1988).
242. If the complicated interplay between state and federal courts caused post-convic-
tion petitioners to waive or default issues, see, e.g.. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 531-32
(1986); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 482-84 (1986), that result is not in the legiti-
mate interest of a state whose primary obligation is to enforce the rule of law, not expe-
dite executions on a criterion-pro se ineffectiveness-that bears no relation to the
legitimate goals of capital punishment.
243. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Being forced to manage and try capital post-conviction
cases without the benefit of counsel for the petitioner also is plainly not in the state post-
conviction court's interest.
244. Wilson & Spangenberg, State Post-Con viction Representation of Defendants Sentenced to
Death, JUDICATURE (forthcoming 1989). In only 2 states (Georgia and New Hampshire)
is there no right to counsel in the initial post-conviction proceeding; in 15 other states
appointment is discretionary. Id.
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to provide all state death-sentenced prisoners with appointed coun-
sel in federal habeas corpus cases, 245 and the development of death
penalty "resource centers" in a number of states,246 the strong, de-
veloping view is that the state interest is in providing counsel. 4 7
The cost of providing counsel does not reverse that interest.248
V. STRIKING THE BALANCE
A. The Due Process-Based Access Analysis Uninformed
by Other Constitutional Rights
The three relevant factors in the due process-access to court
balance cannot be evaluated in isolation. It is the unique combina-
tion of them that strikes the balance in favor of providing post-con-
viction counsel to death-sentenced inmates.
Original capital post-conviction proceedings often provide the
only available remedy for the violations of capital fair trial rights
245. See supra note 236.
246. Wilson & Spangenberg, supra note 244. These resource centers, which are being
developed or exist in 13 states, would provide the advice and counsel of expert death-
penalty lawyers to attorneys handling capital post-conviction cases.
247. Cf Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2692 n.7 (1988) (plurality opinion)
("[Clontemporary standards, as reflected by the actions of legislatures ... provide an
important measure of whether the death penalty is 'cruel and unusual.' "'). The relevant
inquiry in the due process analysis is not as far-reaching; it is, instead, whether state and
national practices help define a state interest or help assess the weight that it should be
given. Because this inquiry is more limited, the practices need not be as universal as they
must be in order to support the finding that a practice is barred completely by the eighth
amendment.
248. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25, 43 (1972); (Burger, C.J., concurring in the result); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963). On December 31, 1987, there were 915 prisoners on death rows in the
17 states that do not provide for the mandatory appointment of counsel on post-convic-
tion. See Wilson & Spangenberg, supra note 244. U.S. Dep't ofjustice, Capital Punishment
1987, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS BULL., July 1988. Many of those prisoners are not at
the state post-conviction stage of capital litigation. Of those who are, many will have
either appointed or volunteer counsel. See Mello, supra note 142, at 555-61. More im-
portantly, the total number of new death sentences imposed during 1987 was 299. The
state appellate courts will reverse some of these death sentences on direct appeal. Some
of those sentenced to death will commit suicide or be killed while in prison. U.S. Dep't
of Justice, supra, at 7. Assuming, however, that all 299 prisoners will become capital
post-conviction petitioners, the cost of providing post-conviction counsel in state pro-
ceedings to that number of persons each year is not a significant burden. See Argersinger,
407 U.S. at 37 n.7 (rejecting argument that the cost of providing lawyers to indigent
misdemeanants militated against holding that no defendant could be incarcerated with-
out having been afforded counsel). See also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1979)
(discussing Argersinger) ("[These arguments] were rejected in much larger part because
of the Court's conclusion that incarceration was so severe a sanction that it should not
be imposed . . . unless an indigent defendant had been offered appointed counsel to
assist in his defense, regardless of the cost to the States implicit in such a rule.").
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that can be least tolerated: intentional or at least reckless miscon-
duct by prosecutors and the plainest breaches of the responsibilities
of an advocate by defense counsel. 249 Even this is not enough; the
violations must prejudice the result.25 0 When prejudice is evident,
capital post-conviction petitioners have the deepest interest in rem-
edying the violations. But they cannot without legal help.
A capital post-conviction petitioner simply cannot master the
three complicated, dynamic, and often inconsistent dimensions of
death penalty law. He or she cannot investigate, prepare, file, and
litigate a post-conviction case to completion, sometimes, within a
matter of weeks or months, while facing imminent death, or living
with the disabling consciousness that comes from daily movement,
even if it is orderly movement, towards execution.
When the extraordinary private interest and real risk of error
are weighed against the attenuated state interest in denying counsel,
and more appropriately weighed with the state interest in providing
counsel, the appropriate balance is clear.
What is necessary, and constitutionally warranted, is an auto-
matic right to counsel in state capital post-conviction cases. Counsel,
251
not a counsel substitute, must be appointed to represent death-
sentenced prisoners as soon as the direct appeal is decided.
The representation of death-sentenced prisoners in capital
post-conviction proceedings intimidates the most experienced law-
yers.25 2 It is not a task for law students or lay advocates.25 3 As the
Supreme Court said in Powell v. Alabama,254 "[elven the intelligent
and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science
of law. . . . He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
249. See cases cited supra notes 108-109; D. WILKES, JR., supra note 9, § 1-5, at 4
("[P]ostconviction relief usually is available only on grounds involving egregious error
. . . .i.).
250. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
251. Cf. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480. 497 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part) (re-
fusing to read plurality's requirement of "qualified and independent assistance" to indi-
gent state prisoner threatened with involuntary transfer to mental hospital as
demanding appointment of attorney).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 139-142.
253. When the Court has approved lay advocates as constitutionally mandated coun-
sel substitutes, it has authorized them to provide help to clients in quasi-adversarial pro-
ceedings in which there are important interdisciplinary issues within the competence of
the lay advocate. See e.g., Vitek, 445 U.S. at 500 (Powell,J., concurring in part) ("I do not
think that the fairness of an informal hearing designed to determine a medical issue
requires participation by lawyers."). Capital post-conviction litigation, however, cannot
be characterized as informal and nonadversarial.
254. 287 U.S. 45 (1933).
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prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. ' 255
Discretionary appointment of counsel in post-conviction pro-
ceedings-appointment of counsel if the court decides the pro se
petition is meritorious-is not an adequate remedy for several rea-
sons. Because nonrecord evidence is so often required to establish
the capital fair trial violations and cannot be produced by pro se peti-
tioners, a judge cannot identify from the existing record the poten-
tially meritorious cases in which counsel should be appointed. 5 6
The distinctive features of a capital post-conviction case--e.g., its in-
ordinate complexity, the imminence of the petitioner's death, the
fact that it is an "original proceeding," its potentially accelerated
pace, and the ultimate interest at stake-predict an unacceptable
risk of error if courts are required to divine merit from pro se peti-
tions. The mentally ill or retarded petitioner would be at a special
disadvantage.
A discretionary appointment system, moreover, would revive an
inherently flawed jurisprudence that was properly laid to rest when
the Court replaced Betts v. Brady2 5 7 with Gideon v. Wainwright.258 A
re-invention of Betts in the context of capital post-conviction pro-
ceedings would frustrate finality and undermine judicial efficiency in
precisely the same ways that it did for two decades. 59 It consist-
ently would require a federal court to second-guess the state court's
failure to appoint counsel and thus do significantly more damage to
the states' federalism interests than would an automatic appoint-
ment rule.26 °
Finally, a discretionary appointment rule is inconsistent with
Bounds v. Smith. 26 ' The Court held in Bounds that prisoners were en-
255. Id. at 69.
256. See cases cited supra notes 108-112.
257. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
258. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
259. For commentary on Betts, see Allen, The Supreme Cout, Federalism, and State Systems
of Criminal Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 213 (1959); Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and The
Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CMi. L.
REV. 1 (1962); The Right to Counsel: A- Symposim, 45 MINN. L. REv. 693 (1961).
260. In their amicus curiae brief in Gideon, 22 states observed that "[ilt is now most
unrealistic to expect that the trial judges, looking ahead, can accomplish that which has
obviously been so disturbing to this Court from the vantage point of looking back,"
determining if "special circumstances" require the appointment of counsel. Brief of
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 18, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (No. 155). The states added that Betts was "already an anachronism when [it was]
handed down," and it "spawned twenty years of bad law." Id. at 24. These are the only
reasonable predictive consequences of re-instituting Betts in capital post-conviction
cases.
261. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
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titled to the State's help-under the facts of Bounds, a law library-in
preparing state post-conviction proceedings. 262 In the context of cap-
ital post-conviction litigation, the scope of the right to "affirmative
measures" is the same, but the appropriate remedy is appointed
counsel, not a law library.
B. The Weight of Other Constitutional Rights in the Due Process Analysis
In the unique context of capital post-conviction litigation, the
outcome of the balancing test is influenced by other constitutional
rights. The procedural due process analytic framework reaches be-
yond doctrinal borders and draws strength from other constitu-
tional rights that support the access right.
1. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: A Fundamental Interest
and an Informative Analog.-Capital post-conviction proceedings fre-
quently vindicate the sixth and fourteenth amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel.263 The Supreme Court decisions
that define the scope and value of the underlying sixth amendment
right to counsel 264 highlight the extraordinary value of the liberty
interest in these capital post-conviction proceedings and provide
immediate guidance about how the three factors in the procedural
due process/right to counsel equation should be weighed and bal-
anced in all capital post-conviction cases.
In Powell v. Alabama,265 Gideon v. Wainwright,266 and Argersinger v.
Hamlin,267 the Court recognized and refined a right to counsel in
criminal cases that now attaches in every criminal prosecution in
which a defendant faces incarceration--even a sentence of one day
in jail.268 In Strickland v. Washington269 the Court reiterated the con-
stitutional requirement that counsel be effective T.2 ° Thus, the com-
plete right is not just the right to a lawyer but to the effective
assistance of counsel.
262. Id. at 828.
263. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 110-112.
264. See infra text accompanying notes 272-280.
265. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
266. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
267. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
268. Id. at 37. See also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979) (no constitutional
error where counsel not appointed for defendant and imprisonment authorized but not
imposed).
269. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
270. Id. at 686. See also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970) ("[l~f
the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants
cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel .... ).
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When an attorney fails to provide effective assistance of counsel
to a capital defendant, that defendant's sixth amendment right has
been unconstitutionally denied.2 7' When that death-sentenced pris-
oner seeks to file a post-conviction petition to challenge that denial,
he or she primarily is interested in the underlying sixth amendment
right to effective assistance that the post-conviction process may re-
store. The post-conviction proceeding is the enforcement device;
the right to the effective assistance of counsel is the right that it en-
forces. The compelling value of enforcing the sixth amendment is
an extraordinary private interest in the procedural due process
analysis.
In Powell v. Alabama2 72 the Court held that the right to counsel
is the predicate of a fair trial: "The right to be heard would be, in
many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel. 272 The right "to be heard by counsel" is espe-
cially important where, as in Powell, defendants stand "in deadly
peril of their lives." 27
4
Similarly, in less serious felony cases, "any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him. ' 275 And even in misdemeanor
cases where the possible penalty is one day in jail, "[t]he assistance
of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial."2 76
Even the right to a jury trial, "while important, is not as fundamen-
tal to the guarantee of a fair trial as is the right to counsel.
' 277
If the right to counsel is a fundamental interest when it prevents
the arbitrary imposition of, for example, a weekend jail sentence for
drunk driving, a fortiori it is of fundamental importance when it may
help restore a capital defendant's fair trial right that was unconstitu-
tionally denied.
The sixth amendment decisions also identify an unacceptable
risk of error in pro se criminal trials that exists to a far greater extent
271. See Slrickland, 466 U.S. at 685 ("That a person who happens to be a lawyer is
present at trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitu-
tional command.").
272. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
273. Id. at 68-69.
274. Id. at 71.
275. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335. 344 (1963).
276. Argersinger v. Hamlin. 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972). Justice Powell, concurring in the
result, identified other protected private interests jeopardized by misdemeanor trials in
addition to the loss of liberty, including loss of employment, loss of a driver's license,
social stigma, and civil disabilities resulting from conviction. Id. at 47-48.
277. Id. at 46 (Powell, J., concurring in the result) (footnote omitted).
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in capital post-conviction proceedings. Justice Sutherland, speaking
for the Powell-Court, described the impossibility of even an intelli-
gent capital defendant conducting an adequate pro se defense:
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceeding against him. Without it, though he be not
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does
not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of
men of intelligence, how much more true it is of the igno-
rant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.278
Misdemeanor prosecutions evoke a need for defense counsel to
prevent erroneous convictions not only because the defendant "is
opposed by a law-trained prosecutor, ' 279 but also because such mis-
demeanors "often bristle with thorny constitutional questions
280
that laypersons cannot understand. Capital post-conviction litiga-
tion is far more complex and adversarial.28 t
Finally, in the sixth amendment decisions, the Court balances
the defendant's interest in appointed counsel and the risk of pro se
error against the collective interest of the states in avoiding man-
278. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
279. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (Burger; C.J., concurring).
280. Id. at 33 (plurality opinion): The example of a "thorny constitutional question"
cited by the Court was Papachristou v.Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), which held that
a city vagrancy ordinance classifying the offense as a misdemeanor was void for vague-
ness. Id. at 162. The Argersinger plurality also cited a study that found " 'misdemeanants
represented by attorneys are five times as likely to emerge from police court with all
charges dismissed as are defendants who face similar charges without counsel.' " 407
U.S. at 36 (quoting American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Counsel for Misdemeanants,
Preliminary Report 1 (1970)).
281. See supra text accompanying notes 146-218. In order to understand just one-
the second--of the three complex dimensions of "death penalty" law, a post-conviction
petitioner must comprehend all components of a capital proceeding and then make a
separate determination of whether trial or appellate counsel adequately discharged his
or her responsibilities as an advocate. See supra text accompanying notes 190-194. The
sixth amendment jurisprudence reveals that this first level of understanding is beyond
the reach of a layperson. The second level is even more complicated. See supra note 192
and accompanying text. It requires retrospective analysis of a trial lawyer's judgments,
which inherently are subjective and personal, and the sorting of legitimate tactical from
inadequately justified motivations. The normally and understandably defensive, and
perhaps hostile, trial lawyer must be interviewed and then examined at the post-convic-
tion hearing to establish the "state of mind" as well as the objective components of
inadequate performance. If this elusive first "prong" of ineffective assistance of counsel
is established, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), then the post-
conviction petitioner must conduct the sophisticated, hoiistic inquiry into all the evi-
dence and issues in the case that will determine if the second prong-prejudice-can be
established. Id. In total, the Sitickland inquiry is a complicated multi-level investigation,
but it is premised upon one level of legal knowledge that the sixth amendment cases
have already demonstrated convincingly that a layperson cannot master.
[VOL. 48:455510
STATE POST-CONVICTION RIGHT To COUNSEL
dates that require them to provide counsel to thousands of capital
defendants,28 2 tens of thousands accused of felonies, 8 3 and hun-
dreds of thousands of alleged misdemeanants.2 s4 In every one of
these sixth amendment cases, the states had a more substantial fiscal
interest in denying counsel to defendants than do the states who
today refuse to automatically provide counsel to post-conviction pe-
titioners. s5 In every one of these sixth amendment cases, the "bal-
ance" generated a right to counsel.
Writing in Argersinger, Justice Powell summarized the "evolving
concept" that is embodied in the right to counsel and revealed the
explicit analytic bridge between the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ment-derived rights to counsel, stating: "When the deprivation of
property rights and interests is of sufficient consequence, denying
the assistance of counsel to indigents who are incapable of defend-
ing themselves is a denial of due process. "286
2. The Right of Equal Protection: A Weighed and/or Aggregated In-
terest.-The capital post-conviction petitioner's private interest also
is heightened by the fundamental interest in nondiscrimination that
is reflected in Griffin v. Ilinois2 8 7 and Douglas v. California.21 s There is
a strong argument that equal protection is an independent source of
the right to counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings, -" one
that is compelling when post-conviction proceedings have the char-
acteristics of direct appeals, or even trial motions.
But the interest in equal treatment need not generate a consti-
tutional argument that a court would accept as an independent
ground for decision for this interest to be weighed in the due pro-
cess equation. When life is at stake and representation by counsel
makes such a difference, the state's refusal to provide appointed
counsel to those death-sentenced prisoners who are poor is a possi-
bly fatal form of intolerable discrimination based on poverty that is
cognizable in the due process balance.
An important part of a capital post-conviction petitioner's ulti-
282. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
283. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
284. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25. 37 n.7 (1972) (estimating that "between
1,575 and 2,300 full-time counsel would be required to represent all indigent misde-
meanants, excluding traffic offenders" (emphasis in original)).
285. See supra note 248.
286. Ahgersinger. 407 U.S. at 48 (Powell, J., concurring in the result) (footnote
omitted).
287. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality opinion).
288. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
289. See supra text accompanying notes 116-126.
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mate interest is the interest in not being selected from an otherwise
similarly situated "pool" of death-eligible prisoners simply because
he or she is too poor to hire an attorney (or too unlucky to obtain a
volunteer attorney290 ) who can assert a meritorious fair trial claim.
This right to life has an egalitarian component. The death-sen-
tenced prisoner's "interest" in more egalitarian treatment, whether
or not it amounts to an independent constitutional violation, is
substantial.
Cases identifying an equal protection component of the fifth
amendment's due process clause have long established that inequal-
ity is one species of unconstitutional arbitrariness that is prohibited
by due process.2 ' At a minimum, due process should provide the
capital post-conviction petitioner's interest in equality with the
lesser protection of weighing it as a liberty interest in the due pro-
cess equation.
The Supreme Court has not been reluctant to aggregate due
process and equal protection values to justify the invalidation of
state barriers to effective access to the courts. In Grifn v. Illinois 292
and Douglas v. California 293 the Court held unconstitutional, respec-
tively, the State's failure to provide indigent appellants with free
transcripts of their trials294 and the State's failure to provide ap-
290. Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511, 515 (E.D. Va. 1986) ("The evidence
conclusively establishes that today few-very few-attorneys are willing to voluntarily
represent death row inmates in post conviction efforts.").
291. The source of both equal protection and due process is "an American ideal of
fairness." Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (holding that the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause rendered unconstitutional racial discrimination in education).
Prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, courts recognized an equal protec-
tion right in "law of the land" and "due process" provisions of state constitutions. See.
e.g., Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene 15 (Iowa 1849); Holden v. James, II Mass. 396 (1814);
Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 252 (1858); State Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 539
(183 1); Vanzant v. Waddell, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 230 (1826). The primary architects of the
fourteenth amendment understood that "the absolute equality of all, and equal protec-
tion of each" are "principles in our Constitution that derive from the promise that 'no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.'"
CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. 140 (1857) (comments of Rep. Bingham). See
also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2539 (1866) (comments of Rep. Farnsworth);
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866) (comments of Rep. Poland). The fact
that the drafters of the Civil War amendments added an equal protection clause to the
fourteenth amendment does not mean that they meant to drain the egalitarian value
from due process. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,6 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 341 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65-67 (1932): Chicago, Burling-
ton & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
292. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
293. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
294. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19 (plurality opinion) ("There can be no equal justice where
the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defend-
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pointed counsel on appeal. 29 5 In Ross v. Mofltt 296 the Court ob-
served that "[t]he precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas line of
cases has never been explicitly stated, some support being derived
from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment. ' 29 7 In
Evitts v. Lucey298 the Court specifically identified a due process ra-
tionale for the right to counsel in criminal appeals. It said that by
allowing one's financial capacity to be a determinative factor in
criminal appeals, a state violated not only the equal protection
clause, but "also violated due process principles because it decided
the appeal in a way that was arbitrary with respect to the issues
involved.' '299
Although the due process and equal protection rationales have
been viewed as alternative grounds of decision in these cases, ° ° the
historic, theoretical, and functional interrelationship of the two val-
ues3 0 1 suggests that the Court also may have recognized, or should
in the future, a consolidated equal protection-due process liberty in-
terest. That interest generated a constitutional right to counsel in
all criminal appeals; such an interest clearly exists in capital post-
conviction proceedings as well.
3. The Eighth Amendment's Prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment: Quantification of the Very Limited Acceptable Risk of Error.-Eighth
amendment jurisprudence highlights the "almost uniquely compel-
ling" private interest in life."0 2 In so doing, the eighth amendment's
"death is different" principle 3 0 -certainly the still powerful variant
of that principle that influenced the due process balance in Ford v.
Wainwright° -also greatly limits the quantity of risk of error that is
tolerable. In some due process contexts, the quantity of tolerable
risk is significant; not in this context.
ants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money
enough to buy transcripts.").
295. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357 ("[Wihere the merits of the one and only appeal an
indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitu-
tional line has been drawn between the rich and the poor.").
296. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
297. Id. at 608-09.
298. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
299. Id. at 404.
300. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 n.8 (1974).
301. See supra note 291.
302. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 (1985).
303. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). See
also infra note 127.
304. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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When the extraordinary risk of error attendant to pro se repre-
sentation in capital post-conviction proceedings is calculated, the
eighth amendment helps quantify the minimum amount of risk that
is constitutionally tolerable.3 0 5
VI. DISTINGUISHING PENNSYLVANIA V. FINLEY
In Pennsylvania v. Finley3 16 the Supreme Court considered
whether the procedural requirements governing withdrawal of ap-
pointed counsel that were established in Anders v. California 3 07 were
applicable to noncapital post-conviction proceedings. The Court
held that the Anders protection against arbitrary withdrawal does not
extend to all convicted defendants who seek post-conviction re-
lief.30 8 The Court, extending Ross v. Moffitt,3 0 9 stated that "since a
defendant has no federal constitutional right to counsel when pur-
suing a discretionary appeal on direct review . . . he has no such
right when attacking a conviction that has long since become final
upon exhaustion of the appellate process." ' 0 And, absent a right
to counsel, the Anders protection is inapposite.
In part because the Court's overbroad language obscures differ-
ent potential sources of the right to counsel, 3 " it is not the death
305. In Mello, supra note 5, at 813-14, the author argues that the right to counsel in
capital post-conviction proceedings is a "complex" right that draws aggregate strength
from several constitutional sources. He adds one source to those identified in this arti-
cle: "[T]he necessity of counsel in the postconviction system. could be viewed as a re-
quirement for the meaningful operation of [federal] habeas corpus, especially as the law
of habeas has developed over the last decade into an increasingly complex body of law."
Id. at 814.
306. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
307. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Anders held that withdrawal from a case on appeal would be
allowed if, after "conscientious examination" of the record, appellate counsel were to
find the case to be "wholly frivolous." Id. at 744. Thereafter, counsel may request the
court's leave to withdraw but must accompany that request "by a brief referring to any-
thing in the record that might arguably support the appeal." Id. The indigent appellee
would then be furnished with a copy of the brief and allowed time to raise additional
issues. The court would then determine whether to allow withdrawal or to appoint an-
other lawyer to argue the cause. Id. The Anders Court viewed this procedure as a protec-
tion of the equal protection right to effective assistance of appointed appellate counsel.
Id. at 745.
308. 481 U.S. at 554-55.
309. 417 U.S. 600 (1974). See also Wainwright v. Torna. 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982)
(per curiam) (because respondent had no right to counsel, failure of retained counsel to
file petition for discretionary review in state court was not ineffective assistance). But see
id. at 589 (Marshall J., dissenting) (although sixth amendment right to effective assist-
ance may not have been infringed, respondent was denied due process).
310. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (citing Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S.
1, 7 n.2 (1972) (PowellJ., dissenting)).
311. Indeed, the remedial legal assistance evoked by the due process-access to court
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knell for the due process-based access to court right that the Giar-
ratano courts implicitly recognized312 for several reasons. These
reasons are best organized by examining the Court's reasoning
through the due process analytic lens in the capital post-conviction
context.
3 13
First, the private interest at stake in capital post-conviction pro-
ceedings is significantly more substantial than the interest that was
at stake in Finley. Even though Finley was sentenced to life impris-
onment (apparently with eligibility for parole) for, inter alia, second
degree murder,3t " her interest in vindicating a fair trial right is sig-
nificantly less than that of a death-sentenced inmate. 1 5 In addition,
she was neither litigating her post-conviction claim as part of an ac-
celerated process that makes careful consideration of issues difficult,
nor was she litigating pro se in the shadow of imminent death.
Although she lost her case, she is still alive and able to invoke other
right does not necessarily entail the same "incidental" tinders (or effective assistance of
counsel) rights. See Whitley v. Muncy, 823 F.2d 55, 56 (4th Cir. 1987) (after deciding
Giarratano, Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that access-due process right to counsel
in Giarratano gave sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel); Mitchell v.
Wyrick, 727 F.2d 773, 774 (8th Cir. 1984) ("[Blecause postconviction proceedings are
civil in nature, the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel does not
attach." (citations omitted)). For the purpose of "incidental" procedures or effective
assistance, the latter being the core of the sixth amendment-based right to counsel, the
eroded distinction between civil and criminal proceedings, see supra note 98. still retains
relevance. Thus, recognition of a "limited" right to legal assistance, one that does not
carry with it the "incidental" Anders right, would not have affected the outcome in Finley.
The Court therefore had no occasion to consider whether the due process analysis sug-
gested in this article constitutionally required the appointment of "limited" counsel in
Finley. In fact, the Finley Court expressly rejected the suggestion that "a 'right to coun-
sel' can have only one meaning, no matter what the source of that right." 481 U.S. at
556. Instead, the precise meaning and content of any right to counsel turn on "the
source of that right .. .combined with the nature of the proceedings." Id.
312. Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc in Giarrafano implic-
itly performed the due process analysis to arrive at the conclusion that capital post-
conviction petitioners had a right to counsel. See Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Stipp.
511, 513 (E.D. Va. 1986) (considering risk of error ofpro se litigation); id. at 515 (consid-
ering and weighing the private and state interests); Giarratano v. Murray. 847 F.2d 1118,
1119-20 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (considering and weighing these three factors).
313. Finley's holding flows, not from a due process analysis but from the factually in-
correct assumption that a post-conviction proceeding generally is an attenuated, margi-
nal part of the criminal justice system in which petitioners raise issues that already have
been decided adversely by several courts. Although the peculiar posture of Finle'y hap-
pens to fit the latter description, see infra text accompanying notes 317-320, most capital
post-conviction proceedings do not. See supra text accompanying notes 116-126.
314. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 553 (1987).
315. "[Tlhe penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprison-
ment. however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a
100 year prison term differs from one of only a year or two." Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also supra note 127.
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remedies that may restore her freedom.3t 6
Second, the risk that unrepresented death-sentenced prisoners
will erroneously be deprived of a fair trial right is far greater than
the risk faced by Finley. Finley raised in her post-conviction com-
plaint precisely "the same issues that the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania had rejected on the merits. 3 1 7 The Finley Court noted that
it had previously held in Ross v. Moffitt" t 8 that because such a de-
fendant had ready access to trial and first-appeal briefs and opin-
ions, requiring that defendant to proceed pro se during discretionary
appellate review produced no unacceptable risk of error.3 19  In
short, because Finley's only post-conviction claims had previously
been fully briefed by counsel and decided on the merits, the Court
in Finley concluded that, based on Moffitt, the "guarantee of 'mean-
ingful access' [was not] violated in this case. "320
In contrast, death-sentenced prisoners seek to assert the most
complex original claims that have not been, and could not have
been, adequately briefed or addressed on direct appeal. 32' The
Bounds Court specifically found that the "need for new legal re-
search or advice to make a meaningful initial presentation to a trial
court ... is far greater than is required to file an adequate petition
for discretionary review."3 2 2 The Bounds Court distinguished Moffitt,
the parent of Finley, on this basis.3 23
Thus, while the provision of counsel to Finley would have con-
tributed to the effectiveness of her post-conviction presentation
only marginally given the uniquely repetitive nature of her claims,
this situation constitutes an exception to both the findings in Bounds
and the overwhelming experience in capital post-conviction
proceedings.
Third, the countervailing state interest in not being required to
316. See supra note 127.
317. 481 U.S. at 553.
318. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
319. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-56 (1987). See .1offitt. 417 U.S. at 614-
15.
320. Finley, 481 U.S. at 557 (emphasis added).
321. See supra text accompanying notes 116-12 1.
322. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
323. See supra note 36. Bounds also distinguished 31offitt on the ground that courts
engaged in discretionary review generally "are not concerned with the correctness of the
judgment below," 430 U.S. at 827, and therefore a pro se litigant seeking such review
"need only apprise an appellate court of a case's possible relevance to the development
of the law." Id. at 828. For death-sentenced prisoners, however, a post-conviction pro-
ceeding is quite often the "first line of defense against constitutional violations." Id. See
also supra text accompanying notes 116-12 1.
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appoint counsel for the relatively limited number of death-sen-
tenced prisoners who are incarcerated in those states that do not
provide them automatically with post-conviction counsel3 24 pales in
comparison with the state interest in avoiding like appointment for
each of the tens of thousands of noncapital defendants who enter
the Nation's prisons each year.3 25 Conversely, the state interest "in
insuring that death sentences have been constitutionally imposed"
also is more compelling. 32
6
CONCLUSION
Capital post-conviction petitioners should have an automatic
right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. Counsel are
necessary to enforce the petitioners' access to court right, which,
although it draws strength from the sixth and eighth amendments
and the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection, is
rooted in due process.
Recognition of this right to counsel keeps the promise of our
legal heritage that life must be protected by "the law of the land."
The first settlers carried that promise to this country, embodied it in
the organic charters, constitutions, and declarations of rights of the
colonies and states,3 27 and inscribed it in our federal Bill of Rights
after we became a Nation. 2 8
In our contemporary society, due process has extraordinary
utilitarian value. It harnesses the provisions of the United States
Constitution-the "Supreme Law of the Land"-to protect the life,
liberty, and property of the least honored, and often the least hon-
orable, among us from our sometimes arbitrary and excessive col-
lective retributive anger. There is little doubt that, without counsel,
the law that sorts those who should die from those who should not is
inaccessible.
When the due process-based access analysis is applied to the
extraordinary circumstances of capital post-conviction litigation, it
generates a right to counsel. The capital post-conviction peti-
tioner's interest is the extraordinary interest in enforcing enhanced
capital fair trial rights that protect life. The risk of error attendant to
324. See supra note 248.
325. In 1986 there were as many as 484,615 people confined in state prisons. J.
THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION: THE PARADOX OF THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER 61 (1988).
326. Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118, 1122 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
327. See Shattuck, supra note 87, at 368 (identifying "law of the land" provisions in 28
state constitutions and declarations of rights).
328. Id. at 382-86.
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pro se representation is great. The three complicated, dynamic, and
often inconsistent dimensions of death penalty law tax the compe-
tence and emotional capacity of the most experienced and special-
ized of lawyers. The circumstances of imminent death can further
immobilize pro se petitioners.
There also is little question that the state has the most basic
interest, one that it must honor if it is to be legitimate, in enforcing
the rule of law, even when the laws it enforces are unpopular. Effec-
tive access to the courts that apply that law is the predicate of the
rule of law. The state's interest in the finality of its judgments is an
important interest. It is an interest, however, that presumes a sen-
tence that has been constitutionally imposed and it is an interest
that matures in increments. It is a particularly undeveloped interest
with respect to state post-conviction proceedings that often provide
the first opportunity to correct constitutional mistakes that occurred
during a capital trial or sentencing proceeding. In such proceed-
ings, the right to counsel claim is at least as strong as it is in criminal
appeals.
In any event, neither the state's interest in finality nor its inter-
est in the plenary consideration of issues that will later be presented
to federal habeas corpus.courts is advanced by the denial of counsel
to capital post-conviction petitioners. That denial will obscure the
issues presented in capital post-conviction pleadings, and increase
the frequency with which federal habeas corpus courts will remand
cases to state courts, hold their own evidentiary hearings, or decide
issues that state courts might have first resolved if they had been
more clearly presented. None of these results is in government's
interest, which is one of the reasons that the majority of the states
with death penalties automatically, or virtually automatically, pro-
vide counsel to state death-sentenced inmates in post-conviction
proceedings, and the federal government now provides counsel to
death-sentenced prisoners in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
Thus, the private interest of death-sentenced prisoners in ob-
taining counsel in post-conviction proceedings is extraordinary, the
inherent state interest in providing counsel is strong, its disinterest
(grounded in its legitimate interest in finality) is not advanced by
denying counsel, and the risk of error attendant to uncounseled rep-
resentation is omnipresent. At this stage in the due process analy-
sis, the balance is clear.
Moreover, this balance is informed by other constitutional
rights. The most important right that capital post-conviction pro-
ceedings often vindicate is the sixth amendment right to the effec-
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tive assistance of counsel. The sixth amendment cases emphasize
the fundamental importance of this right, which is the means of as-
serting other fair trial rights, and help identify the generally unac-
ceptable risk of error attendant to pro se representation. The sixth
amendment cases also help to quantify a state's interest, and its lim-
ited disinterest, in appointing counsel to capital post-conviction
petitioners.
The eighth amendment also helps define the very limited risk of
error that is constitutionally acceptable in capital post-conviction
proceedings. The equal protection clause generates an interest in
equal treatment-an interest in not having life denied arbitrarily-
that merits consideration and weight in the due process equation.
In the end, however, the access right should rest on the central
premise of due process. Justice Harlan described the "centrality" of
due process in Boddie v. Connecticut:s2 9
[T]hose who wrote our original Constitution, in the Fifth
Amendment, and later those who drafted the Fourteenth
Amendment, recognized the 'Centrality of the concept of
due process in the operation of . . . [our legal] system.
Without this guarantee that one may not be deprived of his
rights, neither liberty nor property, without due process of
law, the State's monopoly over techniques for binding con-
flict resolution could hardly be said to be acceptable under
our scheme of things. Only by providing that the social en-
forcement mechanism must function strictly within these
bounds can we hope to maintain an ordered society that is
also just. It is upon this premise that this Court has
through years of adjudication put flesh upon the due pro-
cess principle.3 3 0
Recognition that capital post-conviction petitioners are consti-
tutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel would be well-justi-
fied additional doctrinal "flesh" for the principle of due process. It
is only through counsel that capital post-conviction petitioners can
enforce the contemporary "law of the land" that will determine
whether they live or die.
329. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
330. Id. at 375.
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